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INTRODUCTION
On August 14, 1983, United States President Reagan and Mexican President de la Madrid signed the "Agreement Between the
United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area." 1 The Agreement formally recognizes the problems of
uncontrolled water and air pollution along the U.S.-Mexican border.
While it provides a broad framework for eventual cooperation in
resolving common transfrontier environmental conflicts, the Agreement fails to establish any specific implementing arrangements or
binding environmental standards. Instead, the Agreement contains
only general pledges to cooperate fully to "prevent, reduce and elimi'2
nate sources of pollution."
This Note will assess the significance of the Agreement as a
potential solution to U.S.-Mexican border pollution problems. The
1. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States
on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border
Area, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1137 (Aug. 14, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Environmental Cooperation Agreement]. The full text of the Agreement appears in the Appendix,
infra.
2. Id., art. 2.
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Note first discusses current environmental problems and the factors
complicating their effective resolution. The Note then presents a brief
history of water-use relations between the two countries to illustrate
the shortcomings of an ad hoc approach to the resolution of environ-

mental problems. Finally, the Note analyzes the text of the new
Agreement and its probable efficacy. The Note concludes that the
Agreement is largely symbolic in nature, offering neither established
rules of conduct nor enforcement mechanisms to safeguard shared
resources.
I.

THE MAJOR TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
PROBLEMS
A.

GENERAL BORDER CHARACTERISTICS

The U.S.-Mexican border extends approximately two thousand
miles through the Sonoran Desert from the Pacific Ocean to the Gulf
of Mexico.3 The border region lies within the political jurisdiction of
four U.S. states and six Mexican states. 4 The region's population is
largely concentrated in a series of rapidly growing "twin" communities, located directly on the border s
The border region is a single geographic area where the two countries share common air 6 and water resources.7 The international polit-

ical boundary, however, hinders the rational management of these
shared resources.8 The border artificially divides urban areas, water
3. Busch, EnvironmentalManagement: A Basisfor Equitable ResourceAllocation, in
VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 338, 344 (S. Ross ed. 1978).
4. Id. The U.S. states are Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. The Mexican
states are Tamaulipas, Nuevo Le6n, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Baja California.
Id.
5. Id. In the 1970's, it was estimated that 80% of the Mexican and over 70% of the
U.S. border population lived in urban areas. Utton, Overview, 22 NAT. RES. J. 735, 736
(1982). The largest of the twin cities are San Diego-Tijuana, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez, Calexico-Mexicali, Brownsville-Matamoros, and Laredo-Nuevo Laredo. Busch, supra note 3, at
344. Smaller twin border communities with pollution problems include Yuma-San Luis
Rio Colorado, Nogales-Nogales, Bisbee-Naco, and Douglas-Aqua Prieta. Jamail & Ullery,
International Water Use Relations Along the Sonoran Desert Borderlands, in 14 UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA OFFICE OF ARID LANDS, RESOURCE INFORMATION PAPER 5 (1979).
6. Both nations share a common airspace, or airshed. Temperature inversions and
atmospheric conditions prevent air pollutants from dispersing quickly in many border
locales. Pollutants criss-cross the border repeatedly without regard to the international
boundary. Applegate, TransfrontierAir Pollution Along the United States-MexicoBorder, 4
THE ENVIRONMENTALIST 219 (1984).

7. Mexico and the United States share the surface waters of the Colorado, Rio
Grande, Tijuana, San Pedro, Santa Cruz, and New Rivers. The two nations are also beginning to compete for groundwater resources bisected by the border. See Utton, An Assessment of the Management of U.S.-Mexican WaterResources: Anticipating the Year 2000, 22
NAT. RES. J. 1093-1116 (1982).
8. Lyon, Ecology of the Border Region, in VIEws ACROSS THE BORDER 333, 337 (S.
Ross ed. 1978). Lyon names two factors that complicate solutions to transfrontier pollution problems. First, customary international law imposes no general obligation to protect
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basins, and airsheds. 9 Responsibility for resource management falls

within the political authority of two nations with differing legal systems, national objectives, and levels of economic development.10

Successful management of resource problems requires regionwide planning and transboundary cooperation.II Historically, Mexico
and the United States have demonstrated limited success in managing
mutual border resources. The countries have preferred to maintain

their territorial sovereignty and freedom of action without imposing
12
significant international constraints.
The major environmental problems at the border are the shortage
and poor quality of both underground and surface waters and increasing levels of air pollution in urban areas. 13 Explosive population
growth, unplanned urbanization, and rapid industrial development

intensify pressures on transfrontier resources. 14 This Section provides
a neighboring nation's environment. Second, Mexico and the United States do not share
common objectives in addressing ecological problems. Id. This Note will examine these
and other factors in detail. See infra Section II.
9. Many of the twin cities are economically, culturally, and socially very similar, but
are unable to manage common problems as an integrated unit because their respective
national governments give them widely differing roles and responsibilities in solving local
problems. The Mexican cities possess little local autonomy and depend upon the national
government to make major decisions. In the United States, local and state governments
play a much more active role in managing their own affairs. Busch, supra note 3, at 345.
See infra notes 97, 104 and accompanying text.
10. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 1. See Lyon, supra note 8, at 333-37. See also
infra notes 73-110 and accompanying text.
11. See Utton, supra note 5, at 735, 738 (1982); Ross, Introduction (to Commentaries),
in VIEws ACROSS THE BORDER 361, 380 (S. Ross ed. 1978). This binational approach to
resource management is termed the "community theory." As applied to transfrontier
water resources, common water basins are developed, managed, and shared as a unit, without regard to national boundaries. Utton, International Water Quality Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 154, 155 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Utton, International Water Quality Law].
12. See infra Section III(B)(2); infra note 153 and accompanying text. For the proposition that governments are reluctant to give up their sovereign control over natural
resources and prefer loose cooperative arrangements over the creation of independent,
supranational pollution control agencies, see Utton, International Water Quality Law,
supra note 11, at 154, 174-75.
13. Busch, supra note 3, at 344. See infra notes 15-71 and accompanying text.
14. Utton, supra note 5, at 735-36. Rates of population growth along the border have
been astronomical since the 1930's. See Alba, Mexico's Northern Border: A Framework of
Reference, 22 NAT. REs. J. 749, 752 (1982). Current population figures are unavailable; in
1978, however, it was estimated that about 3.5 million people lived in the border region.
Busch, supra note 3, at 344. Growth in the United States' southwest region, the "sun belt"
area, is well documented and expected to continue. See Utton, supra note 5, at 735. Most
of the population growth, however, is occurring on the Mexican side of the border. It is
estimated that about 95% of the border's population growth from 1970 to 1979 occurred in
Mexican communities. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 6. One authority projects a 3.6%
growth rate per year for the Mexican states bordering on the United States. Utton, supra
note 5, at 736. This could lead to a doubling of the region's population by the year 2000.
Id. at 744.
Staggering population increases are due not only to population growth per se, but also to
the heavy labor migration from Mexico's interior to the border region. The northern bor-
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a description of the most serious pollution issues.
B.

INADEQUATE WATER SUPPLIES

An adequate water supply is critical to the future economic development of the border region. Both industrial development and agricultural productivity rely heavily on water consumption.1 5 Continued
urbanization and population growth is also dependent on locating new
sources of potable water. Finally, the exploitation of newly discovered
energy resources in the Colorado River Basin may place new stress on
16
available water supplies.
Water is a scarce commodity in the arid borderlands. Historically, competition between Mexico and the United States focused on
the use of the Colorado and Rio Grande River systems for agricultural
irrigation water. 17 Through the years, the two nations successfully
der has long attracted Mexicans seeking employment opportunities in the industrialized
United States or in the active tourist business generated in the border communities. See
Alba, supra, at 749-63; Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 7. Population increases are also
the result of Mexico's national economic development policies for its northern frontier. In
1965, the Mexican government relaxed its laws against foreign ownership of factories and
reduced import taxes on raw materials; these measures, intended to stimulate the depressed
Mexican economy, were part of an effort to encourage U.S. industry to locate in Mexico.
Since then, more than 600 U.S.-owned assembly plants have located on the border to take
advantage of the large supply of cheap Mexican labor. While drastically cutting the production costs of U.S. firms and providing Mexico with its second largest source of foreign
income, this border industrialization, or maquiladoraprogram, has further increased the
population pressure on border resources. See TIME, Sept. 10, 1984. See generally Hansen,
Economic Growth Patternsin the Texas Borderlands,22 NAT. RES. J. 805-21 (1982); Ross,
supra note 11, at 10-11.
The tremendous influx of people into the border communities causes rapid and unplanned urbanization and exacerbates pollution problems. Population growth far outstrips the
communities' capabilities to plan and fund municipal facilities. Furthermore, the lack of
reliable, current population figures makes projecting future growth rates and planning for
needed facilities difficult. For example, Mexicali, the largest of the Mexican border communities, has probably doubled in population since 1970, despite official Mexican estimates
to the contrary. Inadequate water supply and treatment facilities, whose design was based
on underestimated population growth projections, delay effective sanitation solutions.
Today, residents must boil municipal water to ensure safety. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5,
at 4, 6.
15. Utton, supra note 7, at 1093, 1099; Armstrong, Anticipating TransboundaryWater
Needs and Issues in the Mexico-United States Border Region in the Rio Grande Basin, 22
NAT. RES. J. 877 (1982).
16. Utton, Water Problems & Issues Affecting United States-Mexico Relations: Policy
Options & Alternatives (1978) (manuscript available from the University of New Mexico
School of Law Library and on file at the offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal).
The four southwest states of New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, and Utah contain huge
reserves of coal, oil, shale, and uranium. The United States, in its efforts to become energy
independent, is increasingly demanding the waters of the Colorado River Basin, which it
shares with Mexico, to develop these energy resources. Energy-related water consumption
is expected to create significant water shortages in the Colorado Basin states by the year
2000. Id. at 4.
17. Bath, A Review of Mexico's Water Policy, in Rocky Mountain Council for Latin
American Studies, Proceedings of the 26th Annual Regional Conference (Missoula, Montana) 18 (1980).
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allocated their respective shares of the surface waters of these major
transboundary rivers through a series of formal treaties. s Today, the
major surface flows are completely committed to existing uses. As
municipal, industrial, and agricultural water demands increase, the
border faces a severe and imminent water shortage. 19
C.

GROUNDWATER EXPLOITATION

With full appropriation of the border's surface waters, the nations
are turning to underground water reservoirs (aquifers) to satisfy their
needs. 20 The uncontrolled mining of groundwater, however, creates
further problems for the future. First, aquifers may become irreversibly depleted if pumping exceeds the very slow rate of natural replenishment by rainfall and percolation. 2 1 Already, in the twin city area of
El Paso-Ciudad Ju~rez, uncoordinated drilling of groundwater on
18. Two treaties apportioned the surface waters of the major transfrontier rivers: the
Rio Grande Irrigation Convention with Mexico, May 21, 1906, United States-Mexico, 34
Stat. 2953, T.S. No. 455, and the Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, United States-Mexico, art. 2,
59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, 3 U.N.T.S. 313. For a detailed analysis of these treaties, see
Utton, supra note 7, at 1095-98.
19. Bath, supra note 17, at 18; Utton, supra note 7, at 1093-98. Experts warn that the
two nations must implement greater conservation measures at the border and replace water
intensive agricultural uses with municipal and industrial uses to avoid surface water
shortages by the year 2000. Id Because of its long history of water scarcity, Mexico may
be more aware of the need to conserve border water resources than is the United States.
Bath, supra, at 18.
20. Improved drilling and mining technology allow both countries to pump underground water at an unprecedented rate in order to supplement surface water supplies. See
generally Utton, The Development of InternationalGroundwaterLaw, in INTERNATIONAL
GROUNDWATER LAW 1-24 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Utton,
The Development ofInternationalGroundwaterLaw]. For example, California and Mexico
share common groundwater basins in the Colorado and Tijuana River drainages which are
being pumped from both sides of the border at an increasing rate. Weatherford, Malcolm
& Andrews, California GroundwaterManagement: The Sacred and the Profane, 22 NAT.
REs. J. 1031, 1041 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Weatherford]. For a discussion of a current
conflict between Mexican and U.S. border communities over the groundwater of California's Yuha Valley, see Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 28-36. See also Utton, International Groundwater Management: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier, in
INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 158 n.8 (L. Teclaff& A. Utton eds. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Utton, International Groundwater Management] (describing three other
examples of border conflicts over groundwater near San Luis, Sonora, in the Nogales
region, and in the metropolitan area of El Paso-Ciudad JuArez).
21. Busch, supra note 3, at 350. The amount of water which can be pumped over time
from an aquifer depends on how it is managed. A "sustained yield" is the amount of water
which can be withdrawn annually without injury to the aquifer or to connected surface
water supplies. If more than the annual yield is pumped, an "overdraft" occurs. Overdrafts can cause "1) progressive reduction of the water resource, 2) development of uneconomic pumping conditions, 3) degradation of groundwater quality, 4) interference with
prior water rights, and 5) land subsidence caused by lowered groundwater levels." Charbeneau, Groundwater Resources of the Texas Rio Grande Basin, 22 NAT. RES. J. 957-58
(1982).
Aquifers are exhaustible resources. Continued overdrafting can cause complete exhaustion of the underground water accumulated over hundreds of years, especially if the annual

1986]

BINA TIONAL POLLUTION AGREEMENT

both sides of the border outstrips the aquifer's natural recharge rate. 22
The area is projected to run out of groundwater by the year 2000.23
Second, increased mining of groundwater creates the risk of aqui-

fer contamination. Excessive overdrafting of an aquifer lowers the
water table and allows highly saline surface wastewaters from agricultural and industrial activities to enter and infect the entire underground water supply. 24 The situation is made more critical because
groundwater reservoirs are not self-cleansing, but instead store contaminants indefinitely. 2 5 Because monitoring of underground pollutants is difficult and expensive, aquifer contamination may go
undetected for years.2 6 Even when detected, cleanup is costly and
27
often impracticable.
In view of the often irreversible nature of these problems, it is
crucial that Mexico and the United States prevent rather than react to
groundwater depletion and contamination. The two nations, however,
have been unable to produce a general agreement governing the man28
agement of shared groundwaters.
recharge is small. Utton, InternationalGroundwater: The Case of the U.S.-Mexican Frontier, in INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 180-81 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1981).
22. Utton, supra note 7, at 1107-08. Both cities use groundwater almost exclusively for
their drinking water supplies. Id. at 1107.
23. H.G. APPLEGATE, ENVIRONMENTAL

PROBLEMS OF THE BORDERLANDS 40

(1979).
24. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5,at 2. Mining of groundwater in the El Paso-Ciudad
Jufrez area already has caused contamination of border aquifers by allowing the intrusion
of overlying saline waters. Charbeneau, supra note 21, at 969.
25. Teclaff, Principlesfor TransboundaryGroundwaterPollution Control,22 NAT. RES.
J. 1065, 1066-67 (1982).
26. Id. The management of groundwater is more difficult than that of surface water.
The sources of groundwater contamination are often more numerous and more widely scattered than are the sources of surface water pollution. For example, aquifers can become
polluted when pollutants are discharged onto a land surface comprising the aquifer's
recharge area, into a well tapping the aquifer, or into streams which feed the aquifer. The
underground hydrological pathways of aquifer contamination are neither observable nor
fully understood. Id. Scientists agree, however, that any management of groundwater
must recognize the interrelationship and interdependence between surface and groundwater systems. Mining of groundwater has a direct effect on surface water flow and quality. Utton, supra note 21, at 178-80.
27. Teclaff, supra note 25, at 1066. Professor Teclaff suggests a superfund arrangement
for clean-up of transfrontier groundwater contamination. Id. at 1072-73.
28. Hayton, Institutional Alternatives for Mexico-U.S. GroundwaterManagement, in
INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATER LAW 135 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1981). The problem of groundwater management has only recently received international attention.
Despite the absence of a binational groundwater agreement, Mexico and the United States
have successfully resolved past groundwater problems on an ad hoe basis. For example,
the countries agreed to limit groundwater extractions in the border area near Yuma, Arizona, by means of the 1972 "Minute 242" agreement. Utton, supra note 21, at 157, 159-69.
See infra notes 171-76 and accompanying text. The International Boundary and Water
Commission is also compiling an inventory of transfrontier groundwater resources to be
shared by both nations. Utton, supra note 7, at 1115. See generally Burman & Cornish,
Needed: A GroundwaterTreaty Between the United States andMexico, 15 NAT. RES. J. 385
(1975).
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On the domestic level, both nations fail to manage their groundwater resources effectively. Groundwater regulation in the United
States is left to the states rather than to the federal government. 29 The
four states bordering Mexico, while the heaviest users of groundwater
in the United States, lack adequate laws or enforcement initiative to
control groundwater exploitation.3 0 Mexico's federal government, on
the other hand, has legal authority to control groundwater withdrawals but rarely exercises it.31
This legal vacuum encourages economic waste. Each nation is
developing its groundwater resources as rapidly as possible to outdo
its neighbor.3 2 The presence of five different jurisdictional systems of
groundwater law (four state and one national) at the border hinders
binational management of this vital resource. The likelihood of international conflict and permanent groundwater depletion is great unless
the two nations recognize and formally address the groundwater
33
issue.
29. Hayton, supra note 28, at 137-38.
30. Clark, Overview of GroundwaterLaw and Institutions in the United States Border
States, 22 NAT. RES. J. 1007-14 (1982). Texas has virtually no controls on groundwater
mining. Id. at 1010. See also Johnson, Texas GroundwaterLaw: A Survey and Some Proposals, 22 NAT. Ras. J. 1017-29 (1982). Arizona passed groundwater legislation in 1980
which promises future progress towards management if the new law can survive constitutional challenges. Clark, supra, at 1010. California law is a confusing array of judicially
created doctrines; the legal regime actually encourages excessive pumping by aggressive
users. See Weatherford, supra note 20, at 1031-42. New Mexico has the only comprehensive regulations in effect, but these regulations completely ignore cooperative management
of transborder aquifers with Mexico. Clark, supra, at 1010. See generally Du Mars, New
Mexico Water Law: An Overview andDiscussionof CurrentIssues, 22 NAT. REs. J. 1045-62
(1982).
31. Utton, supra note 7, at 1107. The Secretariat of Agriculture and Water Resources
has authority to regulate groundwater extractions and to prohibit pumping completely if
injury to aquifers occurs. Id. This Note does not attempt to describe the Mexican groundwater legal regime.
32. Utton, supra note 21, at 162-63.
33. See Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict Over Transboundary Groundwaters: Some
Institutionaland Political Considerations, 12 CAsE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 505-24 (1980)
(assessing potential solutions to the groundwater problem). Mumme believes that efficient
development of groundwater is much more important to Mexico than to the United States.
Id. at 519.
Many commentators suggest that conjunctive management of border surface and
groundwater should be placed in a binational agency with authority to designate international groundwater areas, to apportion water resources, and to administer and enforce each
nation's water rights. See Utton, supra note 7, at 1108-12. Several commentators also
contend that the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC) is the proper
agency to assume binational management of all border groundwater, because the IBWC
"has proved successful in the past in dealing with related matters and because utilization of
an existing organization may speed agreement." Burman & Cornish, supra note 28, at 40304. See infra notes 125-34 and accompanying text (discussing the IBWC). On the other
hand, one authority on international groundwater management believes an agreement
establishing parallel legislation for each nation is preferable to a comprehensive treaty placing management in the hands of a supranational commission, because each nation then has
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D.

SURFACE WATER CONTAMINATION

1. A GeneralDescription
The most critical and longstanding international pollution issue
facing the borderlands is the discharge of municipal sewage and industrial wastes from Mexican communities to rivers flowing into the
United States.3 4 The Mexican communities of Mexicali, Tijuana,
Nogales, Laredo, and Naco all lack adequate municipal wastewater
collection and treatment systems. 35 Urban growth is occurring faster
more discretion to decide how it will reach agreed upon goals. Teclaff, supra note 25, at
1074-75.
34. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 2-3.
35. For a brief historical account of Mexicali's pollution problems, see infra Section
I(D)(2).
Since 1970, the population of Tijuana, Mexico, has nearly tripled to approximately one
million inhabitants. As a result, Mexico has been unable to maintain a reliable sewage
collection system or a fully operational sewage treatment facility. Tijuana dumps partially
treated and untreated sewage directly into the ocean which contaminates U.S. beaches
south of San Diego. Because the natural drainage in the Tijuana area is from Mexico to the
United States, frequent breakdowns in the Tijuana sewage disposal system cause overflows
to drain into the San Diego area. G. Baumli, Principal Engineer, U.S. Section, International Boundary and Water Commission, Statement to CaliforniaAssembly Select Committee on International Water Treatment and Reclamation (Mar. 13, 1984) (on file at the
offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal). See also THE ATLANTIC, July 1984, at
19; Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 1983, at 3, col. 4.
Experts predict the situation will become more critical in the future because the State of
Tijuana plans to provide running water to every Tijuana home by 1986. Only about half of
the city's residences presently have direct water access. The new water use will further
burden the sewage system. US.-Mexico: TransboundaryPollutionIssues, Environmental
Protection Agency Briefing Paper (July 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited as EPA Briefing Paper]
(on file at the offices of the Cornell InternationalLaw Journal).
Over the years, Mexico, at the request of the United States, has attempted to improve
Tijuana's sewage disposal system. In 1962, Mexico built a sewage disposal system which
discharged untreated sewage directly into the ocean. This system worked until the early
1970's, when frequent breakdowns and overloads demonstrated the system's inadequacy.
In 1980, Mexico began construction of a new 60 million gallons per day pumping plant.
This plant is now 50% complete, and Mexico has spent 10 million U.S. dollars on the
improvements. Even when completed, however, this new plant will be inadequate to handle Tijuana's sewage loads. G. Baumli, supra, at 4.
San Diego actively assists its Mexican neighbors by treating approximately 65% of the
sewage generated in Tijuana under a 1965 "temporary" emergency agreement. An emergency pipeline connection with the San Diego sewage system was built in 1965 to prevent
sewage flows into the United States from chronic breakdowns in the Tijuana system.
Under the agreement then reached, Mexico pays about $200,000 per year, although the
cost to San Diego of treating Mexico's sewage has risen to about $2 million per year.
Recently, the U.S. Congress began partially reimbursing San Diego with an $800,000 per
year subsidy. Despite this binational cooperation, south San Diego beaches have been
quarantined hundreds of days over the past four years, with accompanying declines in
tourism, property values, public health, and coastal recreation. G. Baumli, supra, at 5.
Mexico acknowledges its responsibility for the sewage problem and plans to construct
new sewage disposal lines to the ocean, south of Tijuana. Mexico warns, however, that its
financial problems will delay completion of the disposal lines for six to ten years. The City
of San Diego is adamant that a solution be found immediately and proposes that a joint
U.S.-Mexican sewage treatment plant be built in the United States under the auspices and
funding of the IBWC. THE ATLANTIC, July 1984, at 20.

96

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:87

than these cities' capability to plan, finance, construct, or maintain
wastewater treatment facilities. 36 The much smaller U.S. border cities, while not entirely free from fault, generally have more effective
37
municipal waste disposal systems than their Mexican neighbors.
Industrial effluents also contribute to surface water pollution.
Many Mexican industries have no on-site treatment facilities, and
industrial wastes, including toxic substances, are dumped directly into
river systems. 38 Although Mexico has adequate legislation to control
both municipal and industrial water pollution, the government is slow
to enforce its regulations or to finance the technology necessary to corOne such joint treatment plant was actually built under the guidance of the IBWC, but
subsequent problems raise questions about its precedential value. In 1972, Mexico and the
United States constructed an international waste treatment plant to serve the two communities of Nogales, Arizona, and Nogales, Sonora. The plant was built in the U.S. community, and Mexico shared in the original construction costs, despite its initial objections to
the location of the plant in the United States and to the higher degree of treatment required
by U.S. laws. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 48-50. Mexico continues to pay a
portion of the plant's annual operating costs, based on Mexico's share of sewage flows
through the plant. This binational sanitation project is a unique example of international
cooperation in transboundary pollution control. EPA Briefing Paper, supra.
New problems, however, now create a dangerous health situation in the Nogales twin
communities. Due to a lack of adequate initial planning, the treatment plant already operates at full capacity and requires immediate enlargement. In addition, an inadequate sewage collection system in Nogales, Sonora, is causing the discharge of raw sewage on both
sides of the border. Id. In early 1979, the U.S. Section of the IBWC complained "that
Mexican authorities have not improved and extended the sewage collection facilities as
needed to keep pace with the rapid increase in population in Nogales, Sonora ....
Jamail
& Ullery, supra note 5, at 50 & n.332. The U.S. Section of the IBWC further states that it
has continually asked Mexico "for immediate and long term corrective measures, but Mexico has provided only temporary corrective works." Id.
Another international sewage problem involves the Rio Grande River. Discharges of
untreated sewage from the Mexican city of Nuevo Laredo into the Rio Grande seriously
endanger the health of people on both sides of the border who rely on the river for their
domestic water supply. Nuevo Laredo has no facilities to treat its industrial or domestic
waste. As a result, 14 million gallons of raw sewage is discharged into the river daily. The
U.S. city of Laredo is also not free from blame. Its existing treatment facilities cannot serve
the needs of its present population. EPA Briefing Paper, supra.
Finally, a water sanitation problem is occurring along the Arizona-Mexico border. Sewage overflows from the wastewater treatment facilities in the Mexican border town of Naco,
Sonora, frequently drain northward across the border, contaminating the drinking water
supply of Bisbee, Arizona. Despite monetary assistance from local U.S. governments and
tentative efforts by Mexico to temporarily repair Naco's facilities, spills of raw sewage still
occur. EPA Briefing Paper, supra. Mexico has rejected a U.S. proposal for the construction of a joint international sewage treatment plant for the area. For a discussion of this
conflict, see Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 52-55.
36. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 4-8. See supra note 14 and accompanying
text.
37. See Comment, Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United States Water Quality
Dilemma, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 152, 161 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Effluent Neighbors].
38. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 2-3. For example, a Mexican copper mine in
Cananea, Sonora, is the source of heavy metal contamination of the San Pedro River which
flows into Arizona. This toxic pollution injures U.S. ranchers and farmers and threatens to
contaminate the drinking wells of Tucson and Sierra Vista, Arizona. Id. at 37. For an
example of industrial water pollution at Mexicali, Mexico, see infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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rect the situation. 39

In addition to inadequately treated municipal and industrial
wastes, a major water quality problem in the border's agricultural

areas is the increase in river salinity resulting from extensive irrigation
practices. 40 When water is applied to a field, salts are leached from the
soil. The return of drainage water causes high concentrations of salt
in downstream water supplies. Highly saline water is unsuitable for
domestic and industrial uses and damages agricultural lands and
crops. 4 1 Mexico and the United States battled over the salinity of the
Colorado River for nearly thirty years before the United States, in a
1973 binational agreement, recognized an obligation to deliver saltfree water to Mexico.42 The salinity of the Colorado River and of
many other transboundary rivers is causing renewed conflict, however,
because of the reduced availability of fresh water for dilution4 3 and
because of the high cost of energy-intensive desalinization processes. 4 4
39. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
40. Busch, supra note 3, at 350. Mexico places a high priority on immediate reduction
of the salinity of its northern rivers due to the adverse effect of high salinity on food production. Therefore, Mexico may be willing to cooperate on other ecological problems if the
United States is willing to respond to Mexico's concern with salinity. See Ross, Introduction, in VIEvs AcRoss THE BORDER 20 (S. Ross ed. 1978).
41. P. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE 297-98'(1981). Farmers can respond to salinity
problems by planting lower value, more salt tolerant crops; by adding more irrigation water
to dilute salts; by applying expensive fertilizer to agricultural land; or by using other sophisticated technology. None of these methods, however, is generally available in a developing
nation such as Mexico. Id.
42. See infra Section III(B)(2)(a) (discussing the historical background and provisions
of this binational agreement called Minute 242). Despite this so-called "permanent solution" to the border salinity problem, agricultural lands in Mexico continue to suffer from
prior and continued U.S. failures to deliver salt-free water; some lands are irretrievably
damaged. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 15-16.
43. See Utton, supra note 7, at 1099-1102. One expert states that "the most pervasive
and important water quality problem facing the United States and Mexico is salinity. Since
the two countries have agreed under Minute 242 on a salinity level for water delivered to
Mexico, an important water quality concern is the effect of energy development on the
future salinity levels in the [Colorado] river." Bishop, Impact of Energy Development on
ColoradoRiver Water Quality, 17 NAT. RES. J. 649, 661, 669 (1977).
It is generally agreed that increased energy development in the upper Colorado River
Basin will increase salt and heavy metal concentrations downriver, violating U.S. water
quality commitments to Mexico. Utton, supra note 7, at 1100-01. Although salinity
problems in the Rio Grande River are not yet critical, increasing population and economic
growth could harm the river's water quality in the immediate future. Id. at 1101. Many
commentators recommend binational cooperation on the control of salinity through active
IBWC monitoring and management, increased water conservation, and reduction of water
intensive uses. Id. at 1102.
44. Ross, supra note 40, at 9. Desalinization, although very expensive, is preferable to
other salinity countermeasures, because it minimizes water loss, limitations on agriculture,
and environmental problems. Id. The United States and Mexico, however, have had little
success with joint desalinization projects. Under Minute 242, the United States agreed to
build and finance a desalinization plant near Yuma, Arizona. The plant took over 10 years
to complete at the enormous cost of over 200 million dollars, while continual procrastination and threats to abandon the project by the United States injured binational relations.
See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 15-16.
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2. An Illustration: The New River Pollution Controversy
Mexico and the United States recently identified the New River

as the most serious transboundary pollution problem facing the two
nations. 45 The New River situation illustrates the recurring pattern of
border sanitation conflicts.
The New River flows north from Mexico into the United States,

eventually emptying into the Salton Sea of southern California. The
New River drains a major agricultural valley in Mexico and already
contains high concentrations of salts and pesticides before reaching the
Mexican border town of Mexicali. At Mexicali, industrial chemicals,
slaughterhouse wastes, and municipal sewage are dumped into the

river. 46 Upon entering the United States, the highly polluted river
poses a severe health hazard to U.S. communities located along its
lower course and adversely impacts the recreational and commercial
47
value of the Salton Sea area.
The major factor in the New River's pollution is Mexicali's inadequate sewage collection and treatment system. 48 Mexicali's population has increased some 1300% in the last thirty-five years. 49 As a
result, its sewage treatment facility, first completed in the mid-1970's,
is overloaded and frequently inoperable. 50 Even when operating cor45. International Boundary & Water Commission, United States & Mexico, Minute
264, Recommendations for Solution of the New River Border Sanitation Problem at Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California Norte, Ciudad Jurez, Chihuahua (Aug. 26, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as Minute 264]. For an analysis of Minute 264, see infra Section
III(B)(2)(e).
46. EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35. See also Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 2127.
47. EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35. The New River flows through the U.S. cities of
Calexico, El Centro, Imperial, Brawley, and Calipatria, and into the Salton Sea, where the
water is used for recreational and irrigational purposes. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1978, at
A19, cols. 1-4. One California water official wrote in a letter to President Carter, "At the
point it crosses the border, the New River is probably the worst example of pollution from
domestic sewage in the United States." Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 26. The Executive Officer of the California Water Resources Control Board stated that "there is human
waste, solids, evidence of industrial pollution and even dead dogs and old tires floating
across the boundary at times." Id. at 25. U.S. officials have had to post signs warning of
contaminated water along many stretches of the New River. Utton, supra note 7, at 1103.
See also Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1978, at A3, cols. 1-4.
48. J. Friedkin, U.S. Comm'r, International Boundary and Water Commission, Statement to CaliforniaAssembly Select Committee on InternationalWater Treatmentand Reclamation at Informational Hearing on New River Sanitation Problem (May 9, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as IBWC New River Statement].
49. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 21. In 1950, Mexicali's population was about
40,000. Id. In 1984, the population had grown to 780,000. IBWC New River Statement,
supra note 48, at 1.
50. Earthquakes, hurricanes, sewage overloads, and lack of maintenance cause chronic
breakdowns of the Mexicali treatment system, resulting in prolonged raw sewage discharges directly into the New River. IBWC New River Statement, supra note 48, at 3.
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rectly, half of the city's population is not connected to the system.5 '

The New River problem is not new or unpublicized. Local, state,
and federal officials of both countries have monitored, studied, and
discussed the situation for over thirty years with little progress

towards a permanent solution.52 Recent efforts to control the river's
53
pollution through binational cooperation are analyzed below.

The United States has consistently demanded that Mexico unilaterally remedy the New River problem.5 4 While the Mexican govern-

ment has never denied its responsibility for the situation, Mexico and
Mexicali insist that they are addressing the problem as effectively as
possible given their limited financial resources. Mexico does not place
a high priority on the New River's quality, arguing that the river is not
used for any agricultural, municipal, or industrial purpose between the
border and the Salton Sea. Mexico also downplays the aesthetic and
recreational concerns of the United States, pointing out that there is
no physical damage to U.S. property.5 5
E.

AIR POLLUTION

In contrast to the high level of international concern surrounding
water sanitation problems, air quality deterioration has received little
attention. The two nations do not perceive border air pollution as a

critical issue, 56 primarily because no significant problem exists along
most of the border. Air pollution is largely concentrated in the few
urban areas which have developed substantial industry. Most of the
existing sources of industrial air pollution are older factories located
57
on the U.S. side of the border.
51. Id. at 1. About 40% of the population uses septic tanks or privies, often located
directly on the banks of the New River. Id. at 2.
52. For a detailed account of unsuccessful past efforts to resolve the controversy, see
Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 21-27. Despite continual political pressure from California residents and a successful media campaign launched by local officials in 1978, which
brought the New River problem to the attention of both national governments, the IBWC
is still negotiating a resolution of the problem. Id. at 27.
53. See infra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
54. The United States Commissioner of the IBWC recently confirmed the U.S. position
on the New River in a public statement, emphasizing, "It is the view of the United States
Section that since Mexico is creating the New River sanitation problem, Mexico must solve
that problem." IBWC New River Statement, supra note 48, at 8.
55. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 27.
56. See Bath, Alternative CooperativeArrangementsfor ManagingAir Resources Along
the Border, 18 NAT. Rs. J. 181 (1978). Professor Bath does not believe that major binational cooperative efforts to solve air pollution will occur in the near future. Id. at 197.
57. See Busch, supra note 3, at 344, 354. No major centers of heavy industry are
located at the border. Existing industry is relatively clean, composed primarily of light
manufacturing and assembly of consumer goods. See Berrueto, Economic Factorsand Considerations,in VIEWS ACROSS THE BORDER 399, 402 (S. Ross ed. 1978); Bath, U.S.-Mexican Experience in Managing Transboundary Air Resources: Problems, Prospects, and
Recommendationsfor the Future, 22 NAT. RES. J. 1147, 1148 (1982).
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The El Paso-CiudadJudrez Pollution Problem

Air pollution has reached critical proportions in one border location. The twin cities of El Paso, Texas, and Ciudad Juirez, Mexico,
share a common airspace which is highly polluted.5 8 Presently, El
Paso exceeds U.S. federal clean air standards, and air quality continues to deteriorate unchecked. Ju6irez has an even worse pollution

problem that is aggravated by its growing population and urban
development.5 9 Because each nation blames the other for'60the problem,
the border serves as a "convenient excuse for inaction.
The three major sources of air pollution are industrial discharges,
automobile emissions, and open-air burning of garbage and farm-

lands.61 While industrial emissions emanate from both sides of the
border, it is estimated that the United States is responsible for 85% of
the area's industrial-source contamination. 62 Both communities contribute to the high level of automobile fumes caused by transborder

traffic, long delays at customs, lack of mass transportation systems,
and Mexico's sale of low-priced leaded fuel. 63 Finally, while the Mexican community is primarily responsible for open-air burning, local

officials have little control over this source of pollution because it is
characteristic of the low standard of living and economic development
in the region.64
Both nations place a low priority on protecting the border's air

resources. Although Mexico has strong environmental regulations for
Major Mexican industrial sources of air pollution within 100 miles of the border, however, include the iron and steel producers of Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n, and the copper
smelter in Cananea, Sonora. Busch, supra note 3, at 344. Mexico will soon complete
another copper smelter in Nacozari, Sonora, while in the United States, a copper smelter
located at Douglas, Arizona, is currently the major source of sulfur oxide emissions at the
border. All three copper smelter plants refuse to install pollution control devices because of
economic hardship in the copper industry. EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35. Finally,
Mexico's plans to build major petro-chemical complexes at the northern border will contribute to already high levels of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons. See Applegate,
TransboundaryAir Quality: Problems and Prospectsfrom El Paso to Brownsville, 22 NAT.
REs.J. 1133, 1137 (1982).
58. See EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35. In his survey of the El Paso-Ciudad Ju6.
rez air pollution crisis, Professor Bath points out that because the region is one of the few
areas of the world where a developed and developing nation meet in an urban setting, the
crisis represents "the global conflict between developed and developing countries." Bath,
supra note 57, at 1147.
59. Bath, supra note 57, at 1152.
60. Id. at 1163. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has actually excused El
Paso from compliance with federal standards because of the international setting, blaming
emissions from Ciudad Juirez for El Paso's air quality failures. Bath, supra note 56, at 187.
61. EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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air pollutants similar to those of the United States,6 5 Mexico fails to
enforce its air quality objectives; especially at the border.6 6 Mexico
believes regulation of air quality will hamper industrial development. 67
The United States' air pollution control policy at the border is
also inadequate. Lack of cooperation between federal, state, and local
officials, budgetary constraints, and unrealistic attainment goals have
68
weakened the effectiveness of strong federal air quality regulations.
The International Boundary and Water Commission, the only bina-

tional agency with experience in managing transboundary resources, is
reluctant to involve itself in the politically controversial air pollution
problem. 69 As a result, little has been accomplished to solve trans70
frontier air pollution.
65. See Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, Legal Aspects of EnvironmentalControl in Mexico:
An Analysis ofMexico's New EnvironmentalLaw, 12 NAT. REs. J. 580-95 (1972). In 1972,
Mexico passed a stringent and comprehensive environmental law which included federal
emission standards for air pollutants modelled closely on U.S. standards. Bath, supra note
57, at 1157. For a brief sketch of Mexico's environmental laws and institutions, see infra
Section II(B)(1).
66. Bath, supra note 57, at 1147, 1164. Ciudad Ju6.rez's location on the border actually
hinders solution of its air pollution problems because the strongly centralized Mexican
government, located in Mexico City, often ignores or is unaware of border problems.
Applegate, supra note 6, at 220. Professor Applegate advocates that both federal governments allow state and local leaders to cooperate informally and pragmatically to solve border issues. Id. at 219-27.
67. Bath, supra note 57, at 1164. Mexico's concern with full employment, economic
development, and industrialization takes precedence over air pollution abatement because
of the nation's limited financial resources. For example, Mexico cannot even afford the
instruments required to measure air pollution. Bath, supra note 56, at 187-88. For a discussion of Mexico's national priorities, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
68. See Bath, supra note 57, at 1153-56. A major weakness of the U.S. Clean Air Act
of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982), as applied at the border, is its federal structure.
Id. at 1153. The Act places primary responsibility for implementation and enforcement of
federal standards on state and local governments, some of which lack regulatory initiative.
Id. at 1154. For example, in order to protect local industry, state officials in Texas consistently ignore EPA mandates by not enforcing federal standards. Id. On the federal level,
the Reagan administration has severely limited the EPA's regulatory efforts through
budget, personnel, and facility reductions. Id. at 1156. The current political climate in the
United States is not supportive of effective pollution control. Binational efforts to abate air
pollution are hindered by the lack of coordination and communication between state, EPA,
and State Department officials. Id.
69. Id at 1160. This reluctance stems from IBWC's traditional role as a technical
agency with expertise in studying and solving surface water-related problems. Id. For a
discussion of the International Boundary and Water Commission, see infra Section
III(A)(2).
70. See generally Applegate, supra note 6, 219-27. Until now, binational efforts to
resolve air pollution problems have been extremely limited. In 1972, the Pan American
Health Council established a joint monitoring program in the El Paso-Ciudad Jufrez area
to identify sources and measure levels of air pollutants. Ross, supra note 11, at 370. In
1981, San Diego and the State of Baja, Mexico, formally agreed to cooperate in air quality
monitoring and control while still retaining each nation's decision-making autonomy. See
Nalven, A Cooperation Paradoxand an 'Airy Tale Along the U.S.-Mexico Border (mimeograph, San Diego Community Research Assoc. 1981). This agreement represents "a major
departure in Mexican federal policy." Id. at 20.
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2. A Prognosis
As urbanization and industrialization increase, many other border communities will experience the air quality problems found at El
Paso-Ciudad Juirez.7 1 Because of the serious effects of air pollution
on public health, the nations should strive to prevent further contamination of border air resources. Independent, unilateral pollution control efforts by only one nation are ineffective because air moves freely
across the border. If real progress is to occur, the countries must take
72
mutual steps to maintain equal standards on both sides of the border.
II. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES TO
EFFECTIVE BINATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF
TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
Several factors make binational solutions to these ecological
problems extremely difficult. These factors include the differing environmental objectives and domestic legal regimes of the two nations,
the lack of coordination between the many agencies dealing with the
problems, and the long tradition of mistrust between the nations.
These obstacles have led Mexico and the United States to resort to ad
hoc resolution of resource issues.

A. DIFFERING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PERSPECTIVES
Mexico and the United States do not share common environmental objectives because of their different levels of economic prosperity. 73
Mexico, a developing nation, has a very different perception of its
national problems and priorities than does the highly developed and
affluent United States. Mexico's environmental problems stem largely
from poverty and the lack of economic development, while environmental harm in the United States has resulted from a high level of
71. For example, the Texas cities of Brownsville, Eagle Pass, San Benito, McAllen, and
Progreso all face severe air pollution problems in the near future. See Applegate, supra
note 57, at 1133-38.
72. See Ross, supra note 11, at 370. Professor Bath believes that neither nation is willing to submit management of border air pollution problems to a binational superagency
because they do not perceive the problem as critical. Despite doubts about the IBWC's
capability to resolve air resource problems, Bath believes that, because of its apolitical
nature and past experience with water resource management, the IBWC is the most logical
binational body to address such issues. Bath hopes that by linking air and water pollution
issues under the IBWC agenda, air resource problems will gain the formal recognition and
attention they deserve. See Bath, supra note 56, at 187-92; Bath supra note 57, at 1165.
73. Applegate, supra note 6, at 221. Mexico views U.S. concern with environmental
protection as "the most recent fad in a rich country.... ." Lyon, supra note 8, at 333. See
also Fano, The Role of InternationalAgencies,in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 219,

220 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1978).
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industrialization and urbanization. 74
Mexico's foremost concern is to provide its impoverished people
with the basic necessities of life. Mexico believes that its problems of
poor housing, nutrition, and water quality; unemployment; and poverty can be solved only through rapid economic development. 75 Envi-

ronmental concern will merit attention only when a sufficient level of
economic development is reached at the border.76 As a result, the
Mexican government channels most of its limited financial resources

into industrial development. 77 Environmental programs rank at a low

priority. Any residual funds available for pollution control are applied
to the more severe environmental problems facing Mexico's interior
cities. 78 Mexico perceives U.S. concern with providing zero levels of
pollution at the border as a threat to the region's continued
79
industrialization.
The United States generally places a much greater emphasis on
environmental protection than does Mexico. The objective of the U.S.
ecological movement is to improve an already high quality of life and
74. Ross, supra note 11, at 370. Many scholars agree with the 1972 United Nations
Conference's assessment that environmental problems of developed countries are "very
largely the outcome of a high level of economic development," while those of developing
countries are "predominantly problems that reflect poverty and the very lack of development of their society." Id. See Report of a Panel of Experts of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Environment and Development (the Founet Report)
(International Coalition No. 586, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Founet Report]. See also
Doud, InternationalEnvironmental Development: Perception of Developing and Developed
Countries, in POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES 41-50 (A. Utton ed. 1973).
75. See Founet Report, supra note 74, at 10-11.
76. Bath, supra note 57, at 1157-58. Mexico has endorsed the Third World position,
adopted at the 1972 Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, accepting
pollution as the inevitable price for economic growth. Id. This position is based on the
perception that there is an inevitable conflict between economic development and pollution
control. Many Third World countries agree that "if pollution is part of the development
process and higher levels of economic development can only be bought by increased levels
of pollution, then so be it." Id. at n.35. But see Leonard & Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries: A PoliticalPerspective, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 281312 (1981), which presents the view that developing nations are giving increased attention
to pollution problems, but must overcome significant political and institutional barriers
before coherent environmental policies and regulations will be enforced. Id.
One striking example of Mexico's lack of concern for pollution is the relocation into
Mexico of U.S. plants producing hazardous substances such as asbestos. Mexico is inviting
such relocation despite potential health hazards to its workers because of its unemployment
problems. Applegate & Bath, Hazardous and Toxic Substances in United States-Mexico
Relations 19 (paper presented at 2nd Bi-National Conference on Regional Impacts on U.S.Mexico Relations, Tucson, Ariz., May 25, 1983).
77. Bath, supra note 57, at 1157. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
78. Mexico's emphasis is on improving the country's interior. Most of Mexico's pollution control efforts are directed to the severe air pollution problems of Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Mexico City. See Bath, supra note 57, at 1157-58. Mexico is reluctant to spend
money on pollution abatement projects which benefit the United States or to accept foreign
aid from its northern neighbor because of national pride. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at
7.
79. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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to increase the level of aesthetic amenities available to its citizens.8 0
At the same time, the United States is better able to afford the expensive pollution control technology necessary to reverse the damage that
81
progress has caused.
This general assessment of U.S. environmental fervor, however, is

not accurate for many portions of the border. With the exception of
southern California, the border region is one of the most impoverished
sections of the United States.82 Because environmental protection is
traditionally a concern of higher income groups, the border popula-

tions of both nations show relatively little concern for pollution
problems. As a result, local officials and national agencies of neither
country are under public pressure from border communities to remedy
83
transfrontier pollution.

B.

THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL STRUCTURE

Mexico and the United States have two of the most comprehensive and stringent municipal systems of anti-pollution law in the
world. Mexico's environmental law incorporates many of the same
regulatory schemes and concepts of pollution found in U.S. environmental law.8 4 Neither nation, however, adequately applies its national
environmental laws at the border.85 Cooperative arrangements or substantial joint efforts are hindered by the multitude of agencies and
levels of government responsible for border problems.8 6
1.

Mexican Law and Institutions

In Mexico, concern for environmental protection first arose in the
early 1970's with the passage of the comprehensive Federal Law for
80. Lyon, supra note 8, at 334.
81. The Mexican Director of the Center for Border Studies of the North recently stated
that Mexico lacks the resources to throw money at environmental problems the way the
United States does: "Things in Mexico cannot be resolved f ]a Americana. They must be
resolved within the resources of Mexico and the priorities of Mexico. The United States
wants to resolve third-world problems in a first-world manner; they don't realize the thirdworld is on their border." N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at A2, col. 4.
82. Bath, supra note 56, at 187. One study points out that binational relations are often
strained by the ironic juxtaposition of economically stagnating U.S. communities and economically growing Mexican cities at the border. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 13.
83. Bath, supra note 56, at 187-88. In contrast to most border communities, the southern California public has put great pressure on local, state, and federal officials to resolve
water sanitation problems at Tijuana and the New River. See THE ATLANTIC, July, 1984,
at 19. See supra notes 35 & 52.
84. See Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, supra note 65, at 587 & n.17. See also supra note
65; infra notes 88 & 91.
85. See infra note 93; note 106 and accompanying text.
86. Applegate, supra note 6, at 219-20. See infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
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the Prevention and Control of Environmental Contamination.8 7 This

law provides for the prevention and control of all forms of pollutants
and polluting activities capable of degrading or altering the environ-

ment's natural state. 88 The federal executive is given exclusive power
89
to promulgate pollution regulations and sanctions.

On its face, the Mexican law sets a very high level of environmental protection. 90 The law aims at the virtual elimination of all pollution. Any discharge of wastewaters which "might cause
contamination" requires a federal permit. 9 1 The law also establishes
92
tough emission standards for air pollutants.
Despite the stringency of Mexico's environmental laws, environmental protection is ineffective, especially at the border. 93 Mexico's
desire for industrialization has foreclosed expenditure of its limited
finances on expensive pollution control equipment and on the training
87. Mexican Anti-Contamination Law, Diario Oficial, Mar. 23, 1971. For a general
description and an English translation of the law, see Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, supra note
65, at 580-95. See also Acevedo, Legal Protection of the Environment in Mexico, 8 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 22-42 (1978).
In 1982, Mexico passed a new Federal Law for Protection of the Environment. The new
law provides stiff fines and criminal sanctions for polluters, and contains provisions covering hazardous substances. Applegate & Bath, supra note 76, at 11. It is too soon to assess
the impact of the new law on environmental protection in Mexico.
88. Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, supra note 65, at 587-88. The Mexican law is comprehensive environmental legislation, covering all types of pollution-air, water, noise, pesticides, and heat. The law defines "pollution" as any alteration of the natural environment.
This concept is consistent with U.S. environmental laws because it characterizes pollution
as a change in quality rather than in the human use of a resource. The law also contains
provisions strikingly similar to the U.S. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4370 (1982), requiring government agencies to consider and avoid environmental
injury in taking any action. Id. at 587-88.
89. Id. at 587. This grant of power differs from U.S. environmental law which authorizes the federal government to set pollution standards but allows the states to implement
and enforce the standards. Applegate, supra note 6, at 220. See infra notes 101, 104 and
accompanying text. The centralized Mexican system of environmental regulation somewhat simplifies binational cooperation on pollution control because U.S. officials can disregard Mexican state and local governments in negotiations. See Mumme, supra note 33, at
520. Conversely, local Mexican officials are confused and often resist initiatives by U.S.
state and local governments to negotiate directly with them because this decentralized
approach is foreign to Mexican policy-making. See THE ATLANTIc, July 1984, at 19, col.
3.
90. Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, supra note 65, at 594. These authors conclude that
"Mexico can now boast one of the world's most impressive legal regimes for environmental
protection and control for virtually every aspect of the environmental crisis." Id.
91. Effluent Neighbors, supra note 37, at 168. The Mexican law's water quality provisions are similar to the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), because both prohibit any water pollution discharges and are
administered by federal permit. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
92. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
93. See Leonard & Morell, supra note 76, at 302-03; Applegate & Bath,supra note 76,
at 11, 22-23. See also supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing Mexico's failure
to protect border water quality); notes 58-67 and accompanying text (discussing Mexico's
refusal to uphold clean air standards at the border).
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of environmental specialists. 94 Critics blame the bureaucracy of the
highly centralized federal government in Mexico City for inefficiency
and corruption in administering the laws. 95 Furthermore, the federal

government places little emphasis on the problems of a distant border
96

region.
In Mexico, state and local governments have no authority or
responsibility for managing their pollution problems. 97 This prevents
Mexican border communities from implementing cooperative efforts
directly with their U.S. counterparts.
At the federal level, three executive agencies are involved in border environmental affairs. The Secretariat of Urban Development and
Ecology (SDUE) has prime responsibility for administering Mexico's
environmental law. 9 8 The Secretariat of Agriculture and Water
Resources (SAHR), however, has exclusive power over the manage-

ment of national water resources. 99 The Ministry of Foreign Relations

further complicates the institutional framework because it guides all

negotiations for binational cooperation through the proper political
and diplomatic channels, 0o
2.

US. Law and Institutions

In the decentralized political system of the United States, environmental policy is determined and enforced by institutions at federal,
state, and local levels. Primary responsibility for setting air and surface water quality standards lies with the federal government.101 The

Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 set an objective
of eliminating all pollution discharges into navigable waters. 0 2 The
Clean Air Act also establishes stringent national air emission standards and prohibits any deterioration of existing air quality.103
94. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. See also Schramm, Human-Institutional
Factors,in WATER IN A DEVELOPING WORLD 190-93 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1978)
(discussing the lack of skilled natural resource technicians and managers in Mexico).
95. See Applegate & Bath, supra note 76, at 10-12.
96. See supra notes 66 & 78 and accompanying text.
97. Juergensmeyer & Blizzard, supra note 65, at 587. The new 1982 environmental law
appears to give some new but limited responsibility to the Mexican states to initiate pollution control arrangements directly with U.S. state and local governments. See Applegate,
supra note 6, at 220.
98. Applegate & Bath, supra note 76, at 10-11.
99. Mumme, supra note 33, at 505, 518. For a description of the administration of
water resources in Mexico, see Bath, supra note 17, at 18-23.
100. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10-11.
101. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. IV 1980); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).
102. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)
(1976).
103. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. IV 1980). The Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS). Id. There are two types of NAAQS's. A primary NAAQS is one that the EPA
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The individual states administer and enforce the federal pollution
standards through permit systems and state implementation plans.
The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, has
the power to preempt state control if a state fails to implement its
programs satisfactorfly. 1° The EPA, therefore, has ultimate authority
for control of air and surface water pollution.
The regulatory framework is further complicated by the federal
government's decision to leave responsibility for groundwater management completely in state hands. The border states do not yet have
effective groundwater protection laws. 105
Like Mexico's environmental policy, U.S. environmental policy

has failed at the border. First, the federal pollution control laws set
impracticable attainment goals and unrealistic timetables for achieving
those goals. Second, state and local environmental control agencies
have resisted compliance with high federal standards. Finally, the
EPA has not effectively implemented or enforced the laws, especially

at the border. 106
Cooperation between the United States and Mexico is hindered
further by the many levels of U.S. government responsible for environmental policy at the border. Each state government has its own dis-

tinct environmental laws and further delegates local control over
decides is necessary to protect human health and safety. Id. § 7409(b)(1). A secondary
NAAQS is one that the EPA deems necessary to protect public welfare. Id. § 7602(h).
The Act also contains a section entitled Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air
Quality (PSD). Id. § 7471. This section is designed to control emissions in regions that
have air quality better than that required by the national ambient air quality standards. Id.
104. Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan designed
to attain the national air quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The
state plans must be approved by the EPA. Id. § 7410 (a)(2). If a state fails to enforce its
plan, the EPA may enforce it. Id. § 7413. If a state fails to submit a plan that meets EPA
standards, the Administrator must intercede and prepare a plan for that state. Id. § 7410
(c)(1).
The Clean Water Act created a permit system under which discharge permits can be
granted by the EPA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976), or by a state with EPA-approved permit programs. Id. § 1342(b). The EPA may veto a state permit, id. § 1342(d)(2), or withdraw approval of a state permit program, if a state fails to comply with the requirements of
the Act. Id. § 1342(c). The Act authorizes the states to bring enforcement actions against
permit violators and against dischargers without permits. If the state fails to act, however,
the EPA must enforce the water quality standards. Id. § 1319.
105. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. See generally Note, Federal Water Pollution Laws: A CriticalLack of Enforcement by the EPA, 20 SAN DiEGO L. REV. 945
(1983). The states, primarily responsible for enforcement of environmental protection laws
under the federal system, face budgetary constraints, lack of personnel, and an unfavorable
regulatory climate. Applegate & Bath, supra note 76, at 23. Furthermore, the border
serves as an excuse for not meeting federal standards. Officials allege that they have no
control over pollutants discharged from Mexico and entering the United States. See supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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pollution to county and city governments.10 7 State and local entities,
however, have no authority to act in international matters, and neither
the U.S. State Department nor the International Boundary and Water
Commission actively solicit state or local input in binational
negotiations. 108
On the national level, several independent agencies with widely
differing objectives affect U.S. policy. The State Department, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Geological Survey, the Bureau
of Reclamation, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Forest Service, the Water Resource Council, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Customs, and the Army Corps of Engineers all play a
role in border problems.109 Many of these agencies have no expertise
in or sensitivity to environmental problem-solving at the international
level. Because there is no effort to coordinate the actions of these various agencies as they affect the border, environmental policy changes
are incremental and often inconsistent. 10
3.

The InternationalArrangement

At the international level, the International Boundary and Water
Commission is the only institution formally designated to manage
U.S.-Mexican border resources."1 It is "the only institution on the
border with a truly regional orientation," and its jurisdiction overlaps
with that of the above-mentioned national, regional, and local bodies.1 12 The International Boundary and Water Commission, however,
has a poor history of incorporating the input of other interested
groups in its "tightly closed policy-making system." 113 This traditional weakness delays rational resource protection at the border.

C. A TRADITION OF MISTRUST
The third factor hindering binational cooperation of shared border resources is the long tradition of mistrust and ad hoe resolution of
107. See Utton, supra note 7, at 1093-95 (describing the institutional context for water
resource management at the border); Bath, supra note 57, at 1153-56 (describing the U.S.
policy framework for air pollution management at the border); Mumme, supra note 33, at
517-21 (describing the institutional context for groundwater management at the border).
108. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 11.

109. Id.
110. Applegate, supra note 6, at 221-22.
111. Effluent Neighbors, supra note 37, at 164; Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10. The
IBWC enjoys permanent status under the Treaty. Id. For a discussion of the Commission's past history and present role in resource management, see infra notes 125-52 and
accompanying text.
112. Mumme, supra note 33, at 516.
113. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 12. In fact, the IBWC has allowed local and state
governments and private organizations virtually no input into water management decisions.
Id. at 17.
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resource issues between the nations. 114 The United States has dominated Mexico politically and economically since the mid-19th cento the control of scarce water
tury. 115 This dominance extended
16
border.'
the
resources along

Other contemporary issues which complicate and disrupt U.S.Mexican relations include illegal immigration, the devaluation of the
peso, Mexico's unfavorable trade balance with the United States, drug
trafficking, investment of U.S. capital in Mexican industry, and U.S.
interest in Mexican energy resources. These urgent and complex con-

problems and intertroversies often take priority over border pollution
17
fere with efforts at environmental cooperation.

III. THE NATURE OF PRIOR BINATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO
MANAGE TRANSBOUNDARY POLLUTION
PROBLEMS
A.

1.

THE BASIC

FRAMEWORK

The Water Treaty of 1944

Mexico and the United States long argued over their respective
rights to the waters of the major transboundary rivers before reaching
agreement in the 1944 Water Utilization Treaty. l" 8 This major treaty
quantified each nation's share of the Tijuana, Rio Grande, and Colorado Rivers." 9 It represented a compromise between each country's
114. Id. at 12-17.
115. The loss of one-half of its territory to the United States as a result of the MexicanAmerican War (1846-48) has engendered a deep hatred in Mexico for its militarily stronger
northern neighbor. Past territorial disputes over the international boundary, fishing rights
in territorial waters, and Mexico's nationalization of foreign oil companies further injured
relations between the countries. See Ross, supra note 40, at 1-21.
The tremendous economic disparity between the United States and Mexico further
increases the tension between the two countries. Mexico has long been economically
dependent upon the United States. Id. at 10-12. For example, Mexico sells about twothirds of its exports and buys about two-thirds of its imports from the United States. In
addition, U.S. citizens account for about 85% of the foreign visitation to Mexico, helping to
make tourism Mexico's second largest industry and accounting for $2 billion annually in
U.S. dollars. Joyner, U.S.-Mexican Energy Relations in the 1980's: New Resources Versus
Old Dilemmas, 12 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 485, 499 (1980).
116. See infra note 120. See generally POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES: UNITED STATES-MEXICAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (A. Utton ed. 1973).
117. See Joyner, supra note 115, at 499-501; Mumme, supra note 33, at 521-22. Mexico's energy resources also give it new negotiating strength in its relations with the United
States. This should allow Mexico to obtain more favorable results in pollution conflicts.
Id.
118. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers
and of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S. No. 994, 3 U.N.T.S. 313 [hereinafter cited as 1944 Water Treaty]. For an analysis of the history and terms of the Treaty, see
Note, A History and Interpretation of the Water Treaty of 1944, 12 NAT. RES. J. 600-14
(1972).
119. Utton, supra note 15, at 1095. The 1944 Treaty quantified Mexico's share of the
Colorado River at 1,500,000 acre feet per year, and allocated the annual waters of the lower
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claims of territorial dominance and prior appropriation of these
waters. 120 Because Mexico was in an unequal bargaining position,
however, the United States was able to dictate the actual terms of the

Treaty.1 21 Mexico's water allocation was less than it was entitled to

under equitable utilization principles, and it received no guarantee of
Rio Grande about equally between the two countries. Id. An earlier 1906 Treaty guaranteed Mexico 50,000 acre feet per year from the upper Rio Grande. Treaty with Mexico
Relating to the Rio Grande and Distribution of the Waters Thereof, May 21, 1906, 34 Stat.
2935, T.I.A.S. No. 455 [hereinafter cited as 1906 Water Treaty].
120. Effluent Neighbors, supra note 37, at 160-65. For years, the United States unilaterally allocated the waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers to its southwest states,
primarily for use in irrigation. In the early 1900's, Mexico objected to large water diversions from the Rio Grande River by U.S. farmers and ranchers in New Mexico and Colorado. Mexico, due to its long territorial settlement in the border area and prior use of the
water for irrigation, based its claim to this water on the doctrine of prior appropriation.
See McCaffrey, Trans-boundaryPollution Injuries: JurisdictionalConsiderationsin Private
Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 205-09 (1973).
The United States responded to Mexican demands with the so-called Harmon Doctrine,
denying the existence of any rule of international law that prohibited an upstream state (the
United States) from diverting water from a downstream state (Mexico), despite harm to the
downstream state. 21 OP. ATr'Y GEN. 274, 282 (1895). Id. at 206. The United States,
according to what it considered accepted principles of international law, denied any liability for damage to Mexican agriculture due to its southwestern states' Rio Grande water
diversions. The United States did, however, eventually negotiate an equitable apportionment of the waters of the Rio Grande based on existing uses in the 1906 Water Treaty. Id.
at 207-08.
The United States nevertheless continued to embrace the Harmon Doctrine and deny
Mexico a legitimate share of water in the Colorado River Basin. In the 1920's and 1930's,
the southwestern states controlled development of the Colorado Basin and attempted to fix
allocations of the Colorado River before Mexico could develop uses in the aftermath of the
Mexican Revolution. Finally, in the 1944 Water Treaty, the United States was forced to
recognize Mexico's legitimate water demands under the equitable utilization principle.
Effluent Neighbors, supra note 37, at 161. The equitable utilization principle provides that
each state within an international drainage basin is entitled to share in the beneficial uses of
the waters. Note, Restoring the Water Quality of the GreatLakes: The Joint Commitment
of Canadaand the United States, 4 CAN.-U.S. J. INT'L L. 212 (1981).
121. One historical analyst explains:
The terms of the treaty.., by their very nature give rise to the suspicion that they
are not a close approximation of what Mexico might have been expected to agree
to had a genuine compromise taken place. The terms relating to quantity...
might have been subject to further modification, if Mexico had not been forced to
capitulate altogether.
In the matter of water quality... it is doubtful Mexico had any say whatever in
the final terms of the Treaty ....
[I]nsistence on dealing with that topic would
have created such firm resistance on the part of the United States that there would
have been no treaty at all, and this was not a possibility Mexico could afford to
consider .... There was quite definitely an inequality in the bargaining positions
of the parties, above and beyond the situation of the extreme pressure of the
drought which ultimately compelled Mexico to come to agreement on a basis not
chosen by it. This inequality was manifested in several ways, not least of which
was the location of the United States as the upstream riparian....
Note, supra note 118, at 608, 610, 611.
The United States' willingness to negotiate with Mexico probably reflected concern with
maintaining harmony in the American hemisphere due to wartime conditions in Europe.
The United States also feared that if the controversy was decided by arbitration, Mexico
would be awarded larger water allocations under equitable utilization principles. Effluent
Neighbors, supra note 37, at 161-62. See also Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 14.
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the quality of the water to be delivered by the United States.1 22 As a
result, the Treaty "created as many problems as it temporarily
123
solved."
The Treaty, however, was the first tentative recognition by the
two governments of the importance of border sanitation problems.
The Treaty states that the two nations "hereby agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border sanitation problems." 1 24
2. The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission
The 1944 Water Treaty replaced the old International Boundary

Commission, created in 1889 to examine and settle boundary demarcation disputes, with the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).125 The nations gave the revised IBWC new

responsibilities for "the application of the present Treaty, the regulation and exercise of the rights and obligations which the two governments assume thereunder, and the settlement of all disputes to which
its observance and execution may give rise. .... -126 Specifically, the
Treaty authorizes the Commission to plan, build, and manage water
works; to enter into further agreements relating to international
waters; and to settle disputes between the nations involving Treaty
27
interpretation.1
The IBWC is the only international agency with specific author-

ity to address water pollution problems along the border. 128 The
Commission's jurisdiction is limited to the boundary sections of the
122. Note, supra 118, at 607-13.
123. A. SPRINGER, THE INTERNATIONAL

LAW OF POLLUTION: PROTECTING THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES 154 (1983).

124. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 118, art. 3. The Treaty also established an order of
preference for the joint utilization of waters. Domestic and municipal uses were given
highest priority. Agriculture and stock-raising were next on the list, followed by electric
power, other industrial uses, navigation, and fishing and hunting. Id. This priority of uses
still governs implicitly all agreements made pursuant to the Treaty.
125. See Mumme, The Backgroundand Significance of Minute 261 of the International
Boundary and Water Commission, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 223, 224 (1981). The original
Commission was created by the Convention of March 1, 1889, to ascertain the fluvial
boundary between the United States and Mexico where the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers form the international border. Disputes along this frontier were frequent because the
two rivers often change their courses, occasionally creating mid-stream tracts of land called
"bancos" with contested sovereignty. Note, The InternationalJoint Commission (United
States-Canada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (United StatesMexico): Potentialfor Environmental ControlAlong the Boundaries, 6 NYU J. INT'L L. &
POL. 499, 500-01 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Potentialfor Environmental Control].
126. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 118, art. 2.
127. Id., art. 24. The IBWC's judicial role is extremely limited. The Commission is
authorized to act as an arbitral tribunal to settle disputes involving Treaty interpretation
only with the permission of both nations. Id The nations have seldom used the IBWC in
arbitration, choosing to emphasize the Commission's administrative functions. See Potentialfor Environmental Control, supra note 125, at 511.
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers and to works located upon the common boundary. The IBWC also has jurisdiction over works entirely
within the territory of one of the nations if the project requires cooperation between the countries for its construction or management.129
The IBWC is not a politically independent supranational
agency. 130 Rather, it is composed of two national Sections (one from
each country), each Section composed of technical engineers and legal

advisors. Each Section reports directly to its nation's foreign office for

3
policy guidance.1 '
Since 1944, the IBWC has largely limited its role to the planning
and construction of flood control and municipal sewage treatment
works.' 32 With its staff of engineers, the IBWC has achieved greatest
success in the production and supervision of a series of joint waterway
management projects. 133 The IBWC has also been effective in the col-

lection and distribution of technical information on the border's
hydrologic problems. Because each Section maintains a field office on
the border, the IBWC is able to monitor and detect boundary

problems on a continual basis. Communication and information
exchange between the two Sections is excellent. 134
3.

Limitations of the Treaty and the IBWC
While the Water Treaty and the IBWC are often acclaimed as

major accomplishments in international cooperation, both the Treaty
and the agency have severe limitations which reduce their effective-

ness.' 35 First, the Treaty's language does not adequately provide for
binational regulation and control of border pollution problems. The

language contains no substantive obligations or principles for water
quality protection.' 36 The Treaty was written at a time when salinity
129. Mumme, supra note 33, at 510-11.
130. Id. at 513. The IBWC's policy-making responsibilities are subject to its member
governments' guidance and approval. Id. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
131. Potentialfor EnvironmentalControl,supra note 125, at 501-02. The U.S. Section is
under the authority of the State Department, while the Mexican Section reports to the
Ministry of Foreign Relations. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10.
132. See Mumme, supra note 125, at 225-26. Because the IBWC has purposely limited
its responsibilities to technical water management projects, one analyst describes the IBWC
as nothing more than an "international Army Corps of Engineers." Effluent Neighbors,
supra note 37, at 164.
133. Potentialfor Environmental Control,supra note 125, at 504-05. The Commission
has completed two major international storage dams, several smaller diversion dams, two
international sanitation systems, and several river rectification and flood control programs.
Id.
134. Id. at 506. The IBWC's liaison activity is probably its most important and successful function to date. Mumme, supra note 33, at 512.
135. Mumme, supra note 125, at 225.
136. Sepulveda, Mexican-American International Water Quality Problems: Prospects
and Perspectives, 12 NAT. RES. J. 487 (1972). In the 1960's, this shortcoming led to an
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was the major water quality problem. Pollution was not a major concern of the two nations in 1944. The Treaty's nebulous provision "giv-

ing preferential attention to... sanitation problems" is inadequate for

137
the resolution of today's more complex pollution problems.
Second, the IBWC has attributed minor significance to the
Treaty's concern with border sanitation. The IBWC has construed
narrowly the Treaty's mandate for "solution of all border sanitation
problems." The IBWC has limited its sanitation responsibilities to the
development of sewage disposal projects, 13 8 refusing to address the
more complex and hazardous problems of industrial discharges, toxic
wastes, groundwater mining and contamination, and air pollution.
Apparently, the IBWC wishes to avoid political controversy over its
139
jurisdictional authority.

The IBWC also refuses to use its clearly defined Treaty powers to
their fullest extent. The Commission has authority to initiate investigations' 0 and to make decisions involving the utilization of the international waters. These decisions, referred to as "Minutes," are
binding on the nations unless one of the governments objects within
thirty days. 4 1 These informal decision-making powers give the IBWC
tremendous discretion to focus both nations' attention on environmeninternational dispute over the quality of the waters of the Colorado River delivered to
Mexico by the United States. Id. See infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
137. Mumme, supra note 125, at 225.
138. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text. Except for the agreements on control of salinity in the Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, the IBWC has never negotiated an
agreement on a non-sewage related pollution problem. Mumme, supra note 125, at 225
n.12.
139. See Mumme, supra note 125, at 226. See also Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 1718. The IBWC is faulted for a "myopic focus on the integrity of the international border"
and for a decision-making style based on principles of national sovereignty which makes
comprehensive, binational solutions to new transfrontier environmental problems difficult
without radical reform of the agency. Id. at 18. The same study states, "[Un fact, a reluctance to innovate is a matter of pride among officials in both sections of the Commission."
Id. at 17.
140. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 118, art. 24. Section A of article 24 requires the
Commission to "initiate and carry on investigations and develop plans for the works which
are to be constructed or established in accordance with the provisions of this and other
treaties . . . ." Id.
141. Id., art. 25. Article 25 provides:
Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in the form of Minutes ... with
copies forwarded to each Government within three days after being signed .... If
one of the Governments falls to communicate to the Commission within thirty
days ... the Minute... shall be considered to be approved by that Government.
The legal significance of a Minute is not clear. In the United States, Minutes have the
legal status of an executive agreement, but are not equivalent to a formal treaty. An IBWC
Minute, therefore, is always subject to legal challenge as not binding under U.S. or international law. Mumme, supra note 33, at 515. For discussion of executive agreements, see
infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. An IBWC Minute often is nothing more than a
general reactive response to a crisis situation. See infra Section III(B)(2).
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tal problems and to make recommendations for their solution. 142 The
apolitical Commission, however, has denied itself any role in the fashioning of environmental policy, relying on the uncertain initiative of
executive levels of government to bring an issue before the Commission. The IBWC consistently avoids political controversy, preferring
to concern itself only with data-gathering, acting as a liaison between
the two foreign offices, and completing assigned water projects.143
Finally, the nations have not granted the IBWC the power or the
status of an independent supranational agency. The IBWC's jurisdiction is extremely limited. The IBWC is authorized to protect only
surface waters 144 at the boundary. 14 5 It has no jurisdiction over
groundwater or air pollution. It cannot regulate sources of pollution
distant from the common border. Thus, the IBWC as presently constituted is unable to manage the border region as a single integrated

ecosystem. 146
Although the IBWC has enumerated power to enjoin violations,
settle disputes, and make recommendations involving Treaty matters,
the Commission lacks enforcement power. 147 The U.S. Section is further restrained by its dependence upon Congressional enabling legislation for funding and implementation of the Section's international
Minutes. Congress has maintained a tight reign on the autonomy of
the IBWC by allocating funds only to specific technical projects. 148
Both the United States and Mexico have placed their respective
Sections under the direct control of their foreign offices. The IBWC
must solicit the political support of both countries' foreign offices
before initiating resolution of a border problem. 149 As a result, the
IBWC is subject to a slow and cumbersome diplomatic decision-making process.15 0 When political conflicts of interest arise, both Mexico
and the United States often bypass the Commission, limiting the
IBWC's legislative and judicial roles. 15 1 Neither nation is prepared to
give the IBWC independent authority to act in controversial environ142. Mumme, supra note 33, at 513. The IBWC's recommendations are seldom rejected

by the national governments. Id.
143. Id at 513-14.
144. Id. at 514.
145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
147. Mumme, supra note 125, at 225 & n. 11.
148. Id. at 226-27.
149. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying
text.
150. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10. See infra text accompanying note 177.
151. See Potentialfor Environmental Control, supranote 125, at 514-16. The protracted
dispute in the 1960's over the salinity of the waters of the Colorado River delivered to
Mexico by the United States is an example of both nations' unwillingness to submit border
resource issues to the IBWC for impartial settlement. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
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mental matters, traditionally considered to be part of a sovereign's
15 2
domestic jurisdiction.
B.

THE BASIC PROBLEM: AD

Hoc

DECISION-MAKING

Ad hoc decision-making characterizes environmental relations
between Mexico and the United States. The nations manage common
environmental problems by reaching temporary accommodations.
Because the nations tend to ignore problems as long as possible, their
decisions are ad hoc responses to environmental crises. This ad hoc
approach is the underlying cause of the increasingly serious pollution
conflicts at the border, because it fails to establish binding rules of
15 3
behavior to guide future management of border pollution problems.
1.

Consequences of the Ad Hoc Approach

Ad hoc, episodic resolution of pollution problems has several negative consequences. First, ad hoc resolutions are reactions to environmental damage after the fact. Early and ongoing prevention of harm,
however, is the key to protection of the environment.15 4 Damage to
some resources, such as groundwater, may be irreversible.1 5 5 Monetary compensation cannot restore scarce resources. Subsequent restoration of the environment, even if possible, is more expensive than
preventative management. 156
Second, the ad hoc approach precludes predictability in international relations. 157 Nations cannot rely on customary international
law to protect their resources from transnational pollution. No specific, generally accepted obligation in international law forbids environmentally
harmful
activities.15 8
Increasingly,
however,
international organizations, tribunals, and commentators recognize
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Mumme, supra note 33, at 516, 524. See supra text accompanying note 12.
Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10, 12-20. See infra Section III(B)(2).
See Utton, International Water Quality Law, supra note 11, at 171-72.
See supra notes 21, 25-27 and accompanying text.
156. See A. KIss, SURVEY OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL ENvIRONMENTAL LAw 14 (1976).
157. See Carroll & Mack, On Living Together in North America: Canada, the United
States and InternationalEnvironmental Relations, 12 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 35, 41
(1982).
158. A. Kiss, supra note 156, at 41. "Under general international law, a state has sovereign control of the land, air, and water resources within its boundaries." A. LEVIN, PROTECTING THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT: PROCEDURES AND PRINCIPLES FOR PREVENTING
AND RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSIES 41 (1977).
If transnational environmental injury causes private damages, a pollution victim may
request his own government to intervene by invoking general principles of international
liability to obtain compensation from the injury-causing nation. A. Kiss, supranote 156, at
41. However, nations seldom intervene in such transboundary environmental cases. Id. at

40.
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state responsibility to control transboundary pollution. 15 9 Under this

general obligation, the injured nation must prove material damage by
clear and convincing evidence to establish a polluting nation's liability
in an international claim. 160 This is a heavy burden, however, because
proving causation, identifying polluting sources, and quantifying damages is difficult. 161 Even if liability is established, no mechanism exists
to enforce a judgment against a recalcitrant state.1 62 Under present

law, the threat of international liability does not deter polluting
activities. 163
Binational agreements must establish the obligations and standards of conduct which international law fails to provide. Because
transborder pollution problems are recurrent, the resolution of
159. A. LEVIN, supra note 158, at 40. International tribunals first acknowledged the
principle of international liability for environmental injury in three relatively early decisions: Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. lb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (International Court of Justice
found Albania liable to Great Britain for failure to notify British ships about mines placed
in Albanian waters), Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), III U.N. R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1949) (Canada liable to United States for damage caused in the state of Washington by
Canadian smelter's fumes; Canada required to prevent future damage), and Lake Lanoux
Case (Fr. v. Sp.), 62 Revue G6n6rale de Droit International Public 79 (1958), discussed in
JudicialDecisions, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) (argument by Spain that France's proposed water diversion project definitely would cause pollution of water flowing into Spain
states a claim for violation of a treaty between the parties). See also A. LEVIN, supra note
158, at 40 & nn.164-66.
Principles 21 and 22 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment later
incorporated this general rule of international liability for environmental injury:
Principle 21
States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
Principle 22
States shall cooperate to develop further the international law regarding liability
and compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental damage
caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond
their jurisdiction.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14 & Corr.1 (1972), reprintedin 11 I.L.M. 1420 (1972).
The Helsinki Rules of 1966, promulgated by the International Law Association, also
endorse these principles of transboundary liability as the international law for rivers. Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, International Law Association (London, Aug. 20, 1966), reprinted in part in J. BARROS & D. JOHNSON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 77-80 (1974). The rules hold that a state does not
have the right to pollute so as to cause "substantial injury" to another state. Id.

160. Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of TransnationalPollution, 69 AM.
J. INT'L L. 50, 75 (1975).

161. A. Kiss, supra note 156, at 54. Current monitoring technology is often unable to
identify individual polluters or their relative contribution to total damage, especially if the
pollution is long-distance. It is also difficult, for example, to value the actual damage
incurred by pollution of a river. Id.
162. Fischer, Acid Rain, Deploying PrivateDamage Actions Against TransboundaryPolluters, 19 TRIAL 56, 62 (Apr. 1983).
163. A. Kiss, supra note 156, at 54-55.
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existing disputes is not enough. National interests often change over
time, preventing diplomatic resolution of future grievances. Prospective cooperative arrangements providing specific rules and administrative machinery for enforcement of these rules are necessary to prevent
chronic environmental disputes.164
The third negative consequence of the ad hoc approach is that the
lack of agreed upon rules for resolving environmental disputes harms
foreign relations. Pollution conflicts worsen diplomatic relations to
the point that other political and economic matters are adversely
1 65
affected.
2. Ad Hoc Responses to BorderPollution Problems
Three past examples of the ad hoc approach to Mexican-U.S. pollution conflicts illustrate the inadequacy of the ad hoc approach.
These disputes were all minor in comparison to the array of environmental issues now facing Mexico and the United States. If the disputes discussed below could not be satisfactorily resolved by ad hoc
decision-making, the nations should not expect to use this method to
resolve existing and future problems.
a.

Minute 242: ad hoc resolution of the Colorado River salinity
crisis

A major shortcoming of the 1944 Water Treaty was its deliberate
failure to define the quality of water to be supplied to Mexico by the
United States. 166 The United States insisted that its obligation to
deliver specific quantities of Colorado River water to Mexico did not
imply a good faith obligation not to pollute the waters. 167 An international crisis developed in the early 1960's as the United States' water
deliveries began to include highly saline irrigation drainage waters.
These contaminated waters caused severe damage to Mexico's agricul164. See A. LEViN, supra note 158, at 15.
165. Carroll & Mack, supra note 157, at 41.
166. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 14-15. At the time of the 1944 Water Treaty
negotiations, both Mexico and the United States were aware of the potential for later dispute over the high salinity of Colorado River water delivered to Mexico as agricultural and
energy development increased in the United States. Both countries chose to ignore this
water quality concern to reach a settlement on the more immediate problem of water quantity. Id. at 14. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
167. J.G. LAMMERS, POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 95 (1984).
Although the 1944 Treaty contained no substantive obligations on pollution, it did state
that Mexico was to accept water "from any and all sources." 1944 Water Treaty, supra
note 118, art. 10. The United States argued that the plain language of the Treaty imposed
no affirmative water quality obligations. Mexico responded that a treaty obligation to provide a specific quantity of water necessarily implies a good faith obligation to maintain
water quality. J.G. LAMMERS, supra, at 95.
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tural lands. 168 In retaliation, Mexico began to extract large quantities
of groundwater from the border near Yuma, Arizona. 169 The IBWC
clearly had jurisdiction and competence to solve this dispute under the
Water Treaty. Both nations, however, deemed the situation too politi170
cally explosive for impartial mediation by the IBWC.
Finally in 1973, the nations reached agreement, in Minute 242, on
a "Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of
the Salinity of the Colorado River." 17 1 In this Minute, the United
States recognized its obligation to deliver good quality water to Mexico. In return, Mexico agreed to control its groundwater mining in the
Yuma area so that U.S. water supplies would not be damaged. 172
Minute 242 resolved nearly thirty years of conflict over the interpretation of the 1944 Water Treaty. The nations' decision not to commit themselves to any substantive obligation to control pollution in the
original Treaty caused permanent damage to Mexican agricultural
lands and still affects diplomatic relations at the border. 73 Mexican
officials indicate that their lack of sympathy for current U.S. protests
of border pollution is in retaliation for past U.S. refusal to remedy
Mexico's salinity crisis.1 74
Minute 242 itself illustrates the ad hoc approach to border conflicts. The Minute responds to only one river's water quality problem.
The Minute fails to address the prevention of salinity in the many
other transboundary rivers now facing the same problem. 17 - And
while the Minute is unique in restricting groundwater mining, the
nations were content to limit their cooperation to only one border
aquifer, already damaged by depletions. Thus, groundwater conflicts
along other portions of the border remain unresolved and will cause
176
future international tension and economic waste.
168. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 14.
169. Mumme, supra note 33, at 505-06.
170. Potentialfor Environmental Control, supra note 125, at 514-16. Eventual agreement required the intervention and initiative of both nations' Presidents. Id. at 517.
171. IBWC Minute No. 242, Aug. 30, 1973, Mexico-United States, 24 U.S.T. 1971,
T.I.A.S. No. 7708.
172. Brownell & Eaton, The ColoradoRiver Salinity Problem with Mexico, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 259, 270-71 (1975). This article provides a thorough discussion of the salinity
controversy and its resolution.
173. See supra notes 42-44.
174. See Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 15; Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 1983, at 3, col. 4
(Statement of Mexican Consul General).
175. See supra notes 40, 43 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Minute 242 was only intended as a
temporary, interim response to groundwater conflicts, "pending the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border area." Mumme, supra note 33, at 506.
Fourteen years later, however, the nations have yet to reach a comprehensive groundwater
agreement. See supra text accompanying note 28.
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Minute 261: recognition of the inadequacy of ad hoc solutions

The 1970's brought growing public concern over water and air
pollution along the border. 177 Both nations were dissatisfied with the
IBWC's slow and piecemeal progress in resolving problems under its
limited treaty mandate. 178 As one commentator wrote, "[T]he Commission's recent record for solving water quality and groundwater
problems.., shows it to be hesitant, slow moving, and primarily capable of effecting only ad hoc and temporary solutions that are often too

little and too late . ..

.,179

While both nations recognized that existing institutional mechanisms were inadequate, they also realized that continued cooperative
efforts were necessary to solve border problems.' 80 Minute 261181 was
the response. Approved in 1979, this Minute corrects several shortcomings of the 1944 Water Treaty. The Minute strengthens the
Treaty's mandate to protect boundary water quality; it also gives the
IBWC greater powers, responsibilities, and jurisdiction to meet this
mandate. The Minute broadens the IBWC's traditional role from
merely constructing sewage disposal works to solving any water quality problems "that present a hazard to the health and well-being of the
inhabitants of either side of the border or impair the beneficial uses of
the waters."' 82 The Minute authorizes the IBWC to give "permanent
... and... immediate and priority attention" to existing and future
border sanitation problems. 1 83 The Minute also stresses the prevent184
ative role of the IBWC.
With Minute 261, Mexico and the United States acknowledged
the IBWC as the predominant agency addressing their international
water problems.185 The Minute gives the IBWC ultimate authority to
177. Mumme, supra note 125, at 223 & n.1 (1981). The problems documented in Section I of this Note first gained public attention in the 1970's.
178. Mumme, supra note 125, at 129.
179. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10.
180. In 1979, President Carter and President Lopez-Portillo signed a Joint Communique directing the IBWC "to make immediate recommendations for faster progress toward
a permanent solution to sanitation of waters along the border." White House Joint Communique of Mexican President Jos6 Lopez-Portillo and President of the United States,
Jimmy Carter, On the Occasion of President Carter's Visit to Mexico 1-6 (Feb. 14-16,
1979).
181. International Boundary & Water Commission, United States & Mexico, Minute
No. 261, Recommendations for the Solution of Border Sanitation Problems, El Paso, Texas
(Sept. 24, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Minute 261]. The text of Minute 261 is reprinted in
Mumme, supra note 125, at 233-35.
182. Minute 261, supra note 181, § 1. This language empowered the IBWC to respond
to the full spectrum of surface water pollution issues: salinity, toxic industrial wastes, agricultural runoff, and municipal sewage. Utton, supra note 7, at 1105.
183. Minute 261, supra note 181, § 2.

184. Id. §3.
185. Mumme, supra note 125, at 230.
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determine when a border sanitation problem exists, rather than conditioning IBWC jurisdiction on approval of both governments. The
nations appear to grant the IBWC authority to perform its functions
18 6
with a minimum of domestic interference.
While Minute 261 increases the potential role of the IBWC, it
does not establish rules designed to prevent future water quality
problems. The IBWC still must react to problems on a case-by-case
basis.1 87 Minute 261 does not establish any substantive or binding
obligations. While instructing the IBWC to negotiate joint agreements
on each recognized border conflict, the Minute fails to commit the
nations to any specific standards, preferred control strategies, priority
of action, or specific timetables. It does not extend the IBWC's
authority to address air or groundwater pollution problems at the border.188 While Minute 261 re-emphasized the need for greater bilateral
cooperation, the IBWC is still committed to the ad hoc, incremental
solutions of the past. The costs of this pragmatism are continued volatile diplomatic relations and environmental degradation.
c. Minute 264: adoption of specific environmental standards for
the New River
The IBWC recently demonstrated some success in establishing
specific objectives and standards for the protection of a transboundary
river. The pollution of the New River has plagued border relations for
over thirty years. Despite protracted IBWC negotiations and public
outcry, there has been little progress in abating the severe health hazard existing at the New River.1 89 In 1980, however, the IBWC concluded a binational agreement, Minute 264, for a permanent solution
to the New River problem.190
As a long term goal, Minute 264 provides for the complete elimination of all domestic and industrial wastewaters in the New River at
the boundary "through necessary action by Mexico." 191 This provi186. Id. at 229; Minute 261, supra note 181, § 1.
187. Utton, supra note 7, at 1106. The Commission is to involve itself on a case-by-case
basis in the "identification of the problem, definition of conditions that require solution,
specific quality standards which should be applied, the course of action that should be
followed for its solution, and the specific time schedule for the implementation." Minute
261, supra note 181, § 4.
188. Mumme, supra note 125, at 231.

189. See supra Section I(D)(2).
190. See supra note 45.
191. Minute 264, supra note 45, at 2. In the Minute, Mexico acknowledges its responsibility for causing the New River problem and thus its obligation to fund and operate
improvements to the Mexicali sewage treatment system necessary to dispose of all effluent
from the New River. Mexico's technical advisors projected that the problems could be
solved by 1983 if the Mexican government provided the necessary funding. Id. The problem is still unresolved today. See infra note 196.
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sion represents an important, definitive legal obligation established
between the nations. In the short term, Mexico also agreed to undertake certain improvements in the Mexicali sewage treatment system to
achieve specified interim water quality standards within definite time
frames. 192 The water quality standards are modeled on U.S. water
quality 93 standards and represent a harmonization of both nations'
environmental protection laws. The standards are also a major step

towards the formulation of common international "ecostandards" for
the border as a region. 194 Because reliance on the unilateral enforce-

ment of each nation's environmental policies has proved ineffective in
the past, joint monitoring and control of pollution through international ecostandards holds greater promise for the solution of border

problems.
While Minute 264 is the most progressive water quality management program yet developed by the IBWC, it demonstrates once again
the shortcomings of the ad hoe approach to border problems. First,
the water quality standards of Minute 264 apply only to the New
River. The nations failed to extend these standards prospectively and
comprehensively to all border communities, preferring to react to the

border's extensive pollution problems on a case-by-case basis.
Allowing sanitation problems to reach the critical stage found at the

New River is both economically inefficient and harmful to foreign
relations. 195
Second, although the IBWC is responsible for monitoring Mexico's progress under Minute 264, this binational agency lacks authority to enforce the Agreement's standards and goals. The Minute's
success depends on the good faith efforts of Mexico to finance its paper
commitments. So far, Mexico has failed to uphold its obligations with
1 96
complete impunity. The New River remains highly polluted.
192. Minute 264, supra note 45, at 3.
193. IBWC New River Statement, supra note 48, at 4. These water quality standards
were developed in cooperation with the California Water Quality Control Board and the
EPA. Id. This cooperation is in sharp contrast to the IBWC's typical reluctance to accept
input from other agencies. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
194. Ecostandards are national standards for environmental protection (for example, air
or water quality standards) established and enforced on an international scale. Contini &
Sands, Methods to Expedite EnvironmentProtection: InternationalEcostandards,66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 37, 39-40 (1972) (discussing the role of international ecostandards and the
machinery for establishing them). See also A. SPRINGER, supra note 123, at 89-114.
195. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
196. From early 1982 until April of 1984, Mexico, in violation of its Minute 264 commitments, stopped all work on improvements to the Mexicali sewage system. Although
Mexico has recently resumed work, construction is proceeding at a slow pace with no estimate as to when improvements necessary to meet the interim water quality standards will
be completed. Mexico has not yet submitted plans for the permanent solution to the Mexicali problem nor secured funding for the project. While Mexico has made significant progress in complying with most of the interim water quality standards, it is unable to meet
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THE ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT

The Environmental Cooperation Agreement 97 is the latest agreement in the long history of U.S.-Mexican attempts to cooperate on
border sanitation and water quality issues. With the Agreement, the
nations again acknowledged that the IBWC's ad hoc approach is ineffective in reaching permanent solutions to border environmental
problems. 198 The governments formally agreed to strengthen and
expand both unilateral and cooperative efforts to address pollution at
the border. 199 The Agreement contains both general principles and
certain limited substantive obligations. While the Agreement represents the nations' most definitive commitment to control border pollution, it is still too early to determine if the Agreement will lead to
action and results.
This Section will analyze the structure and language of the Agreement to reveal its strengths, weaknesses, and potential for success in
preventing and resolving transfrontier environmental conflicts. A
careful assessment of the Agreement indicates that the nations have
not adopted sufficiently defined obligations or institutional mechanisms to escape the ad hoc decision-making process of the past.
A.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

Article 1 of the Agreement sets forth three general objectives.
First, the Agreement is "to establish the basis for cooperation between
the Parties for the protection, improvement and conservation of the
environment ...." Second, the nations are "to agree on necessary
measures to prevent and control pollution...." Finally, the Agreement is "to provide the framework for development of a system of
safe fecal coliform levels which indicate the presence of untreated human waste in the New
River. IBWC New River Statement, supra note 48, at 3-5.
197. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra. The Agreement went
into effect on February 16, 1984, after each nation certified that it had completed domestic
approval procedures. Hajost, US-Mexico Environmental Cooperation: Agreement
Between the United States ofAmerica and the United Mexican States on Cooperationfor the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, A.B.A. Quarterly
Newsletter of the Standing Committee on Environmental Law 3 (Spring, 1984). The
Agreement will remain in force indefinitely unless one of the parties notifies the other, in
writing, of its desire to terminate the Agreement. The Agreement terminates six months
after such written notification. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra,
art. 20.
198. EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35, at 1. See supra Section III(B)(2).
199. United States Department of State, United States and Mexico Agree to Cooperatein
the Solution of EnvironmentalProblems in the BorderArea, Press Release No. 313 (Aug.
19, 1983). While the Agreement limits itself to pollution problems at the border, the
nations intend to expand its scope at a later time to the improved management of all natural resources (wildlife habitats, agricultural and forest lands), as well as to cooperation on
problems outside the border region. Id.
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notification for emergency situations. ' '200
These objectives are not very concrete. They express nothing
more than the intent of the two nations to cooperate in the future.
While the objectives do indicate both nations' awareness of the need to

prevent future injuries to the environment, the objectives impose no
substantive obligations on the nations.

B.

THE LEGAL FORM OF THE AGREEMENT

The Environmental Cooperation Agreement is an executive
agreement, not a formal treaty. 20 ' An executive agreement is effected
through the action of the President alone; it does not require the
20 2
approval and support of Congress as does a formal treaty.
The value of an executive agreement is often overrated. An executive agreement lacks the enforceability of a treaty; its success depends
on continued political goodwill between national governments. 20 3 The
violation of an executive agreement is much less internationally
embarrassing than the violation of a treaty because of the greater publicity generated during lengthy treaty negotiations. A treaty more
2 4
fully involves and ensures the support of all levels of government. 0
The success of an executive agreement, however, is dependent upon
later Congressional support to fulfill executive commitments through
funding and implementing legislation. Finally, an executive agreement is often ignored as changes in political leadership and policy
20 5
occur within the contracting nations.

200. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 1.
201. Hajost, supra note 197, at 2.
202. See Leary, InternationalExecutive Agreements: A Guide to the Legal Issues and
Research Sources, 72 L. LIBR. 3. 1 (1979). Considerable controversy exists over the President's constitutional power to use executive agreements in resolving international disputes.
The U.S. Constitution does not specifically provide for the use of executive agreements to
direct foreign policy. Nor does federal law stipulate when an executive agreement may be
used instead of a treaty. Nevertheless, the use of executive agreements to resolve international disputes is becoming more common, and such agreements surpass treaties in number.
Id. at 3.
The State Department has established criteria for determining which form an international instrument should take. The Foreign Affairs Manual of the State Department provides that an executive agreement can be used pursuant to existing treaties, or subject to
Congressional approval and implementation, or under the President's constitutional power.
See 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195 (1970). The present Agree-

ment was not made pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty and did not receive formal Congressional approval; rather, it represents an exercise of the President's constitutional powers to
conduct foreign relations.
In Mexico, the Agreement has the status of a convention; it was submitted to and ratified
by the Mexican Senate on December 29, 1983. Hajost, supra note 197, at 2-3.
203. See Carroll & Mack, supra note 157, at 45 & n.34.
204. Id. at 45-46.
205. Id. at 45 & n.35. The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978,
executive agreements between Canada and the United States for the control of transboundary water pollution, demonstrate the failure of executive agreements to guarantee the
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The Agreement does have more symbolic value than an IBWC
Minute. As discussed, IBWC Minutes have failed to provide compre20 6
hensive and future-oriented environmental protection at the border.

The high level of executive attention given this Agreement reflects the
sense of urgency and priority that both nations place on resolution of
border pollution problems.2 0 7 The Agreement grants national-level
recognition and commitment to pollution issues and may mobilize
20 8
other levels of government to address these issues substantively.
But while the symbolic value of the Agreement is real, concrete action

will not necessarily follow.
C.

SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

An important aspect of the Agreement is its implicit recognition
that the border region is a single ecological unit requiring integrated
and coordinated management of all its natural resources. It is the first
U.S.-Mexican agreement to address all forms of pollution-air, land,
and water.20 9 The Agreement provides a broad mandate for action on
such new and emerging pollution issues as transport and disposal of
hazardous wastes, groundwater contamination, and industrial air
2 10
pollution.
Overall environmental protection at the border should improve
because the agenda for binational cooperation is no longer limited to
traditional surface water sanitation issues as under the 1944 Water
Treaty and its Minutes. In the past, progress on water sanitation conflicts was slow because Mexico, primarily at fault, was expected to
commitment and support of later political administrations. The Nixon Administration's
impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds and the Reagan Administration's
reduction of the EPA's budget have severely reduced the Agreements' effectiveness. Id.
206. See supra Section III(B)(2).
207. See Hajost, supra note 197, at 2-3. A State Department official believes it is significant that President Reagan and President de la Madrid signed the Agreement during a
meeting in Mexico. According to customary diplomatic practice, only foreign ministers
sign a general agreement of this kind. In the United States, the President usually signs only
treaties requiring Senate ratification. Id.
208. The history of U.S.-Mexican relations indicates that solutions to the major water
problems have occurred only after the direct involvement of both nations' Presidents in the
policy-making process. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 10. The Agreement also provides
for renewed input from state and local governments in addressing the border's environmental problems. See infra notes 270-72 and accompanying text.
209. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 5. The Agreement is
also a notable exception to the majority of international environmental agreements which
address only single resources. See, e.g., Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, Nov.
22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S. No. 9257; International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989,
T.I.A.S. No. 4900; Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13,
1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
210. Hajost, supra note 197, at 2.
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remedy its problems unilaterally.2 11 The Agreement's expansion of
cooperation to other environmental issues should promote greater
linkage212 between pollution problems, and more reciprocity between
claims and in the allocation of costs and benefits of resource protection.2 1 3 For example, Mexico can demand concessions from the
United States on issues Mexico considers important-control of hazardous wastes and river salinity-in return for promises to manage its
groundwater pumping and sewage releases. The Agreement's comprehensive scope also allows the nations to undertake conjunctive management of surface and groundwaters, long advocated by border
214
specialists.
The Agreement also expands the geographic scope of future
transboundary cooperation. Previously, IBWC Minutes were limited
to the boundary sections of the transfrontier rivers.2 15 The Agreement, however, defines the border region more broadly as the "area
situated 100 kilometers on either side of the inland and maritime
boundaries. 2 1 6 The Agreement further authorizes the nations to
focus on pollution sources outside the border area of one country if the
2 17
source affects the border area of the other.
D.
1.

SPECIFIC PROVISIONS

The FundamentalObligation

Article 2 contains the Agreement's most significant obligation:
"The Parties undertake, to the fullest extent practical, to adopt the
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution in their respective territory which affect the border area of the
other. 2 1 8 This is the first explicit acknowledgement by Mexico and
the United States of their mutual responsibility to prevent all sources
of border pollution. The provision is a binational affirmation of the
general principle, now evolving in international law, of state responsibility for environmentally harmful activities.2 19 The provision establishes a general legal duty between the two nations to actively pursue
unilateral and cooperative efforts to protect the border environment.
211. See supra notes 34-39, 54 and accompanying text.
212. "[L]inkage is the deliberate conditioning, by diplomats, of progress on one issue in
return for progress on another (perhaps unrelated) issue." Carroll & Mack, supra note
157, at 41 n.26.
213. A. LEViN, supra note 158, at 69.
214. See supra note 26.
215. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
216. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 4.
217. Id., art. 2.
218. Id.
219. See supra notes 158-59, 164 and accompanying text.
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The enforceability and practical effects of this obligation, however, are uncertain. The provision merely provides that the nations
shall take some measures to prevent pollution. 220 The article's qualification, "to the fullest extent practical," substantially weakens the
stringency of the mutual commitment. The qualification acknowledges that financial, technical, and political considerations will limit
the nations' capability to control pollution. 221 As in the past, these
factors could delay or preclude resolution of transfrontier pollution
problems unless new binational institutions are established with compliance controls and sanctions.
2. Implementation Strategies
Article 2 gives each nation complete freedom to choose the methods it will employ to meet their binational responsibility for pollution
control.222 The provision does not commit the nations to any preferred environmental standards, priority of action, dispute settlement
procedure, or timetable for action. Thus, article 2 offers no formula
for attacking specific problems. This lack of specificity creates a great
risk that the Agreement's mandate will be ignored. 223
Article 6 does suggest some possible forms of cooperation. These
include "coordination of national programs; scientific and educational
exchanges; environmental monitoring; environmental impact assessment; and periodic exchanges of information and data .... 224 Article
6, however, is entirely permissive; the nations can elect not to implement any of these measures. 225 Notably, no reference is made to the
adoption of uniform environmental quality standards for the border.
The Agreement seems to regress from the progress made in Minute
264 toward establishing binational ecostandards. 2 26
Instead, the Agreement emphasizes the coordination of national
policies and unilateral responses to border pollution. Article 5 stipulates that the nations will "coordinate their efforts, in conformity with
their own national legislation and existing bilateral agreements .... 227
220. See generally J.G. LAMMERS, supra note 167, at 100.
221. Hajost, supra note 197, at 2.
222. See J.G. LAMMERS, supra note 167, at 100. Under this type of provision, "each
party is free to decide whether it will enact legislation prohibiting the discharge of pollutants, prescribe technological measures ....
build installations for the treatment of waste
water, provide for economic incentives to limit pollution . . . , eliminate certain specific
sources of pollution, or use a combination of these measures." Id.
223. See id. at 100-01.
224. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 6.
225. The non-binding nature of article 6 is clear from its wording: the nations are
obliged only to "consider and, as appropriate, pursue" the suggested environmental protection measures. Id.
226. See supra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
227. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 5.
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In addition, article 18 states that "[a]ctivities under this Agreement
shall be subject . . . to the applicable laws and regulations in each
228
country."
The Agreement's requirement that pollution control efforts conform to national laws apparently limits binational cooperation to mere
229
coordination of each nation's unilateral environmental programs.
The language of the Agreement does not require the United States and
Mexico to harmonize or even consistently apply their own regulations
to domestic activities causing extraterritorial pollution. Moreover,
because the Agreement does not supersede national legislation, it
stifles creative solutions to border pollution problems. 230 The Agreement's failure to emphasize binational control strategies is a serious
shortcoming in light of both nations' poor history of enforcing their
23 1
domestic environmental laws at the border.
3.

The Annex Procedure

The Agreement does not provide specific remedies for the control
of border pollution. Rather, article 3 requires the nations to adopt
specific implementing arrangements through ongoing negotiation of
technical annexes to the Agreement. 2 32 Working groups of experts are
to meet as often as the nations consider necessary to prepare these
annexes. 233
The technical annex provision is now a common feature of international environmental agreements. 234 It allows nations to establish a
framework for joint action when they are unable to formulate specific
transnational rules for environmental protection through diplomatic
channels. Experts from both nations fashion environmental standards
228. Id, art. 18.
229. A minority of commentators argue that environmental cooperation should be limited to setting general inspirational goals and to mere coordination of national standards.
These commentators believe that it is impossible to form a consensus on international regulations through diplomatic negotiation and that any international standards which are
established will represent the lowest common denominator of protection. It has also been
argued that national authorities respond more quickly to new pollution problems than do
international bodies. See A. SPRINGER, supra note 123, at 102. This Note rejects these
arguments.
230. Note, InternationalAgreements, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 239, 244 & n.38 (1984). For
example, the Agreement apparently prevents such innovative approaches to pollution control as pollution charge systems, since such alternatives to traditional regulation are not
recognized by either nations' laws. See generally F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R.
STEVENSON & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES 10 (1977).
231. See supra notes 93, 106 and accompanying text.
232. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 3.
233. Id., art. 11.
234. Contini & Sands, supra note 194, at 40. See also Sands, The Creation of TransnationalRules for Environmental Protection, in TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND
LAW 313-17 (M. Bothe ed. 1980).

128

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:87

and institutional arrangements to protect resources on a continual
basis in an apolitical atmosphere. 235 Technical annexes also avoid the
slow and cumbersome treaty-making process by providing a flexible
236
mechanism for solving rapidly changing environmental issues.
With the annex procedure in place, continued cooperation becomes
less dependent upon the unreliable initiative of national governments.
The Agreement's annex provision, however, lacks many of the
procedural requirements necessary to ensure successful implementation of environmental control measures. For example, the provision
does not define the actual form the annexes will take. 237 It does not
prescribe what environmental issues will be considered and when. It
establishes no procedure for governmental ratification of annexes. The
238
provision also fails to address the legal status of the annexes.
Finally, it provides no machinery to ensure compliance with the
annexes. 239 These deficiencies significantly weaken the potential effectiveness of the annex arrangement.
While the annex mechanism provides the nations an opportunity
to avoid case-by-case resolution of problems, it does not guarantee a
more comprehensive and preventive approach. In fact, the Agreement's annex process is very similar to the 1944 Water Treaty's mandate of authority to the IBWC to initiate investigations and make
decisions in the form of Minutes as a border sanitation problem arises.
As discussed, the Minutes have failed to prevent border conflicts
because of their reactive nature, lack of specific obligations, and unenforceability. 24° The Agreement's annex mandate is subject to a similar
fate unless the nations are prepared to surrender some of their national
sovereignty to a binational environmental regulatory system.
235. Contini & Sands, supra note 194, at 40-41.
236. Id. at 38. Standards arrived at through diplomatic negotiation "may well be outdated by the time the agreement enters into force." Id.
237. The annexes could establish stringent ecostandards or innovative pollutant discharge licensing procedures, or they could merely authorize scientific studies and monitoring programs.
238. See Contini & Sands, supra note 194, at 53-55. The annexes could bind the governments automatically or could be voluntary recommendations without legal
consequence.
In most situations, some form of governmental ratification is required to make an annex
obligatory, because nations are reluctant to give control of binational environmental relations to technical specialists. The ratification requirement, however, merely "shift[s] the
problem of effective regulation from the standard-setting to the standard-acceptance
arena." A. SPRINGER, supra note 123, at 105.
239. See Contini & Sands, supra note 194, at 54. Compliance controls could include
inspection by an international organization, mutual supervision by participating nations, or
monetary sanctions. Id.
240. See supra Section III(B)(2).
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4. PriorNotification and Consultation
The duty to inform and consult a neighboring state when a proposed activity is expected to cause transboundary pollution is slowly
gaining acceptance in the international community.2 4 1 This obligation
is important because it gives nations an opportunity to assess extraterritorial dangers which threaten them, to explore alternatives to environmentally harmful activities, and to prevent significant
transboundary pollution before it occurs.2 42 The Agreement adopts
this obligation in principle and stresses the importance of resource
monitoring, data exchange, notification, and consultation in several of
2 43
its provisions.
The Agreement requires each party to allow the entry of equipment and personnel into its border region "to undertake the monitoring of polluting activities . . ."; the parties also must consult on the
measurement and analysis of pollution sources. 244 In addition, the
nations are to share all information obtained from this monitoring.2 4 5
Article 7 contains a significant binational commitment for protection of the border environment: it requires the nations to "assess, as
appropriate, in accordance with their respective national laws, regulations and policies, projects that may have significant impacts on the
environment of the border area, so that appropriate measures may be
' 2 46
considered to avoid or mitigate adverse environmental effects.
This provision is consistent with the environmental policy of the
United States, as expressed in the National Environmental Policy
Act. 247 Environmental impact assessment is more effective than mere
early notification in preventing environmental injury, because it provides an opportunity for quantitative evaluation of a major action and
2 48
its alternatives before the action is undertaken.
Once again, however, the Agreement fails to define the content of
an obligation. The Agreement contains no guidelines on what information, if any, must be given to the affected nation. No indication is
given of when, to whom, or in what forum the information must be
241. See A. SPRINGER, supranote 123, at 146-49. Customary international law does not
formally recognize a general duty to inform and consult. Id.
242. A. LEvIN, supra note 158, at 1.
243. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, arts. 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12,
15 & 16.
244. Id., art. 15.
245. Id., art. 16.
246. Id., art 7.
247. Hajost, supra note 197, at 3. The National Environmental Policy Act requires a
federal agency to prepare a detailed explanation of the environmental consequences of
major federal actions significantly affecting the environment, and to make that report available to other agencies and the public. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a.
248. A. LEviN, supra note 158, at 9-10.
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made available. 249 The Agreement also lacks an express obligation to
secure the prior consent of the affected nation before undertaking a
harmful project. 250 This greatly reduces the value of the duty to
inform. Finally, the Agreement is extremely vague regarding what
circumstances trigger the duty to provide an environmental assessment. Indefinite terms such as "assess as appropriate" and "projects
that may have significant impacts" are subject to each nation's selfserving interpretation and permit breach of the Agreement's obligation without legal consequence. Success depends on both nations'
good faith compliance. 25 1 Past water quality conflicts between the
United States and Mexico under the nebulous sanitation provision of
the 1944 Water Treaty, however, demonstrate the danger of imprecise
252
transboundary obligations.
5. InstitutionalImplementation
Both nations designated national coordinators to develop and
implement programs under the Agreement. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is national coordinator for the United States,
while the Secretariat of Urban Development and Ecology (SDUE) is
Mexico's federal coordinator. 253 These national environmental agencies are to organize meetings between the nations, make recommendations, and generally coordinate and monitor the Agreement's
implementation. The Agreement also provides that these agencies
254
may be given additional responsibilities in later annexes.
The nations must hold at least one annual "high level" meeting,
alternatively in the border area of each country, to review progress
under the Agreement. 2 55 According to U.S. State Department officials, these meetings will be held under the direction of each nation's
foreign affairs office and are intended to provide overall political guidance to future activities. 2 56 In addition, the Agreement authorizes
meetings of technical experts as often as necessary to implement spe249. See id. at 9-10. The nations cannot look to customary international law to define
the obligation, because the obligation is an ambiguous principle and not well developed in
the few international agreements which adopt it. See A. SPRINGER, supra note 123, at 14748.
250. For discussion of the duty to secure prior consent, see A. SPRINGER, supra note
123, at 150-52. This duty is also not generally recognized in international law. Id. at 150.
251. See A. LEVIN, supra note 158, at 12-13. Levin advocates the establishment of
"agreed rules, prior to the emergence of potential sources of friction, that address in relatively precise fashion the procedural and substantive issues that may arise in the implementation of a system of advance information and consultation." Id.
252. See supra notes 137, 166-74 and accompanying text.
253. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 8.
254. Id
255. Id, art. 10.
256. Hajost, supra note 197, at 3.
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cific annexes. 257 This emphasis on frequent contact between lowerlevel officials with expertise in environmental affairs should promote
cooperation between the nations and avoid diplomatic inertia and
national bureaucracies. 25 8 Significantly, the Agreement does not
require the approval of the nations' foreign affairs offices before
arranging annexes or meetings.
The IBWC's role in the implementation of the Agreement is
unclear. Article 12 states that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall prejudice or otherwise affect the functions entrusted to the International
Boundary and Water Commission, in accordance with the Water
Treaty of 1944. ' ' 259 At the same time, the Agreement does not provide
any specific role for the IBWC in its meetings or annexes. Apparently,
the United States and Mexico have decided to place primary responsibility for border pollution control in the hands of their national environmental agencies. 2 6° The nations are obviously dissatisfied with the
IBWC's lack of progress in solving border problems and its unwillingness to expand its mandate beyond the construction of sewage treatment facilities. 2 61 The countries also may be conceding implicitly that
a major reason for the IBWC's hesitant treatment of water pollution
262
stems from its dependence on the highly political foreign offices.
The impact of the institutional shift toward the environmental
agencies is difficult to evaluate. The EPA and SDUE, as independent
federal agencies, are not required to solicit approval from foreign
offices before acting in environmental matters. 263 Because EPA and
SDUE officials are experts in environmental law, they are better
equipped to resolve the technical and interrelated resource issues of
264
the border than are IBWC diplomats and waterworks engineers.
The EPA and the SDUE, however, may face the same institutional obstacles as the IBWC. The EPA currently is unable to enforce
U.S. domestic laws effectively because of a lack of personnel and fund257. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 11.
258. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
259. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 12.
260. The decision to give a greater role to the EPA-SDUE in transborder affairs is first
noted in a Memorandum of Understanding between the two agencies, entitled "Agreement
for Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary Problems." The Memorandum, negotiated in 1978, was superseded by this Agreement. Jurisdictional competition
between the EPA and the IBWC has been a longstanding problem, focused primarily on
the IBWC's refusal to lobby Mexico to adopt water quality standards similar to those
employed in the United States. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 5, at 11.
261. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 98, 109 and accompanying text.
264. See generally A. LEViN, supra note 158, at 14-15. The input and guidance of technical experts is crucial to resolving the wide-ranging scientific and technological issues
which environmental conflicts inevitably raise. Id. at 15.
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ing and an unfavorable regulatory climate. 2 65 The SDUE, a relatively
new agency with no track record, represents a government notorious
266
for its inability to control pollution.
It is also too soon to predict whether the IBWC will be given
added responsibilities through annexes. So far, however, meetings
convened pursuant to the Agreement have reaffirmed the traditionally
narrow role of the IBWC in the collection of data and identification of
water pollution sources. 267 Officials of the IBWC also deny any
expanded role for the Commission. The U.S. Section states only that
the IBWC will continue as technical advisor to the State Department
and will assist the EPA in reaching solutions to border problems by
268 Thus, it
providing technical information and advice as requested.
appears that the IBWC will remain a parochial organization with its
primary focus on surface water sanitation problems.
The Agreement has neither strengthened the IBWC's authority to
resolve and prevent environmental disputes nor created a more effective transnational agency with authority to enforce environmental policies at the border. Instead, the Agreement designates two domestic
agencies, constrained by national politics and priorities, to guide and
develop binational cooperation. Once again, the nations have refused
to create a supranational regulatory body that might impinge upon
2 69
their sovereignty.

6. Local Participation
The Agreement provides for increased participation by local private and public entities in solving border conflicts. 270 Article 9 recommends, but does not require, the involvement of state and local
governments in meetings held pursuant to the Agreement. International organizations and private groups may also participate in negotiations if both nations agree to such participation. 27 1 Article 13
requires each party to inform and consult with its border states in matters covered by the Agreement. 272 The inclusion of borderlanders in
the decision-making process should spur negotiations and guarantee
the support of local levels of government because the border communities are directly interested in and responsible for environmental
265. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. See infra note 286.
267. Joint Communique, National Coordinators Meeting, San Diego, California and
Tijuana, Baja (Mar. 8-9, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Joint Communique].
268. IBWC New River Statement, supra note 48, at 5.
269. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also supra Section III(B)(2).
270. Hajost, supra note 197, at 3.
271. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 9.
272. Id., art. 13.
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problems.2 7 3 Participation by borderlanders could also increase informal cooperation between local entities of both nations, eliminating the
274
need for continual national-level involvement in border problems.
E.

LIMITATIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

It is important to recognize the serious limitations of the Agreement. First, the nations have committed no funds to implement the
276
Agreement.27 5 Each nation must bear the cost of its participation,
and activities under the Agreement are "subject to the availability of
funds and other resources to each Party. ' 277 Successful implementation of the Agreement's programs, however, depends on appropriation
of necessary funds by each nation's federal government. Inadequate
funding has long been the primary obstacle to pollution control at the
border. Funds for effective monitoring and control of surface water
pollution alone are unavailable in Mexico's current economic crisis.2 78
No amount of rhetoric will change this financial reality.
A second deficiency of the Agreement is its failure to define what
"pollution" actually means for each border resource. The Agreement
does not commit the nations to uphold any specific environmental
standards. This omission could become a major source of controversy
because of the nations' differing social and economic views of pollution.2 79 The nations first must use the annex procedure to define for
each resource a particular level of environmental change that, because
of the potential harm to human interests, is legally significant. 280 Only
after establishing this threshold of binational concern can the nations
decide on specific strategies to make the threshold legally
28 1
enforceable.
273. See A. LEVIN, supra note 158, at 14; Hajost, supra note 197, at 3.
274. See Applegate, supra note 6, at 221-22, who advocates an increased role for local
entities in the solution of border problems. Applegate argues that "informal policy-making" is important at the border, because national goals are not necessarily those of borderlanders. Cooperative efforts must be "based on a pragmatic assessment of what is best for
the local people." Id. at 221.
275. N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1983, at A16, col. 1.
276. Environmental Cooperation Agreement, Appendix, infra, art. 19.
277. Id., art. 18.
278. See supra notes 77, 94, 106 and accompanying text.
279. See supra Section H1(A).
280. A. SPRINGER, supra note 123, at 46. Pollution has no precise meaning in international law arrangements; it is defined in various ways depending upon what is considered
unacceptable environmental change. Pollution can be characterized as.an alteration of the
physical environment; as a certain level of damage to man, his property, or to the environment; as an interference with other uses of the environment; or as waste exceeding the
assimilative capacity of the environment. Regardless of which criteria are used, a threshold
of significant degradation must be set as an enforceable pollution limit with legal consequences triggered by its violation. Id. at 63-84.
281. Id. at 78. Various tactics are available to make a pollution threshold enforceable.
Nations can completely prohibit the discharge of some substances or regulate discharges to
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The Agreement also lacks a specific list of environmental issues to
be addressed through annexes as well as a timetable for the resolution
of specific problems. Although this omission may allow the nations
greater flexibility in negotiating an agenda for treating the various
issues, it more likely will lead to political delay, because the nations
are not formally committed to any plan or priority of action.
Finally, the Agreement contains no mechanism for the enforcement of its provisions2 82 or for the formal settlement of border disputes.28 3 It contains only broad recommendations and general pledges
to cooperate in the future. The nations are not bound to any substantive obligations or to any rules of behavior. The history of environmental relations between the two countries, however, demonstrates
that general principles of fairness and vague treaty obligations are not
sufficient to prevent injury to natural resources. 28 4 Many commentators believe that detailed and binding international regulations are necessary for the rational solution of transfrontier environmental
problems.28 5 Mexico and the United States must use the Agreement's
annex procedure to define transboundary obligations if they are to
avoid an ad hoe approach to pollution problems.
F.

PROGRESS UNDER THE AGREEMENT

Progress under the Environmental Cooperation Agreement has
been slow. 28 6 In March of 1984, high level delegations from both
countries met for the first time under the Agreement's annual meeting
provision to identify major border problems and to discuss areas of
future cooperation. The delegations, headed by EPA and SDUE officials, agreed to establish three technical workgroups on air quality,
water quality, and hazardous materials management. These technical
workgroups are to review problem areas along the border, develop
technical and cost information, and recommend possible corrective
28 7
measures to be implemented through annexes to the Agreement.
keep their effects within acceptable limits. Nations can charge polluters for discharges
above the threshold or place legal liabilities on polluters to deter excessive discharges. Id.
282. Note, supra note 230, at 242.

283. See generally A. LEVIN, supra note 158, at 21-31. Levin advocates the advance
formulation of methods of mediation and arbitration by international organizations for the
settlement of environmental disputes when binational negotiations fail. Id. at 21.
284. See supra notes 137, 166-74 and accompanying text.
285. See Brownlie, A Survey of InternationalCustomary Rules of EnvironmentalProtection, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974);
Contini & Sands, supra note 194, at 39; A. Kiss, supra note 156, at 55. See supra note 164
and accompanying text.
286. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1985, at A2, col. 5. Negotiations have been delayed in part
because of changes in the political leadership of the SDUE. [Current Report] INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 119 (Apr. 10, 1985).
287. Joint Communique, supra note 267.
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The three workgroups, composed of technical experts from the
EPA and SDUE, also held their first meetings in 1984. The discussions produced no technical annexes or concrete solutions to existing
pollution issues. Instead, the meetings allowed each nation's environmental agency to outline its nation's proposals and priorities for the
border.28 8 The Water Quality Working Group, which includes officials of the IBWC, evaluated data and alternatives for the resolution of
sanitation problems at Tijuana-San Diego and at the New River. It
also examined Mexico's concern with the alleged dumping by Californian industries of heavy metals which contaminates marine shellfish
off the Pacific coast. Notably, the management of groundwater
received no publicized attention. 289 The Air Quality Working Group
discussed approaches to controlling border pollution caused by both
countries' copper smelting industry and by automobile emissions.
This Group also agreed to develop emissions inventories for the twin
cities' airsheds. 2 90 Finally, the Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Working Group began to evaluate methods for disposing of
toxic wastes and for controlling the illegal transboundary movement
291
and dumping of hazardous materials.
The wide range of issues initially addressed by the workgroups is
encouraging because it confirms the comprehensive scope of the
Agreement's mandate. It also increases the possibilities for quid pro
quo bargaining between the nations to solve diverse pollution issues.
Although the United States is the main beneficiary of progress on
water sanitation, Mexico may gain more from the control of toxic substances, allowing compromise between conflicting national
292
priorities.
Additional progress under the Agreement was made in 1985.
First, Mexico agreed to unilaterally complete a domestic sewage collection and treatment system for Tijuana. 293 Second, both nations
agreed to place pollution controls on their respective border copper
smelters. The Air Quality Working Group will develop and implement the controls and monitoring arrangement, while the EPA and
294
SDUE will ensure compliance with this binational commitment.
288. See EPA Briefing Paper, supra note 35.
289. See id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
293. [Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 261 (Aug. 14, 1985). Mexico is financing this construction through a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, negotiated under the guidance of the Water Quality Working Group. [Current Report] INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 46 (Feb. 13, 1985).
294. [Current Report] INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 261 (Aug. 14, 1985). The EPA also
gave a "firm commitment" to Mexico that it would bring its copper smelter at Douglas,
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Finally, the EPA and SDUE signed the Joint Inland Contingency
Plan, which provides for future development of a mutual response pro295
gram for spills of hazardous materials.
These recent developments are neither comprehensive nor particularly innovative solutions to border pollution. The United States and
Mexico continue to apply a case-by-case, reactive approach to common problems. The nations rely on exchanges of information,
research, consultation, and monitoring to achieve success rather than
on specific supranational control measures and enforcement provisions. The developments in the past two years, however, demonstrate
the nations' continued commitment to the principles and goals embodied in the 1983 Agreement. The Agreement may still lead to substantial environmental cooperation and improvement at the border as the
nations learn to trust each other through preliminary and incremental
efforts.
CONCLUSION
The 1983 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between Mexico and the United States is a response to both nations' growing concern over water and air pollution along their common border. The
Agreement represents their general consensus that a concerted bilateral effort is necessary to resolve successfully the border's environmental problems. It also recognizes that existing institutional
arrangements for cooperation along the border are inadequate. What
impact the Agreement will have on improving the border environment
remains to be seen. The Agreement fails to establish any detailed standards or specific remedies for environmental protection. Instead, it
establishes a regular consultation procedure between officials of both
nations' environmental agencies. Actual implementation of the Agreement's general obligations is to occur through later negotiation of specialized sub-agreements. The success of the Agreement will depend
upon these specific implementing arrangements. At present, the
Agreement stands merely as a symbol of the nations' renewed commitment to cooperation along the border.
Mark A. Sinclair
Arizona, into compliance with the Clean Air Act "as soon as possible but no later than Jan.
2, 1988." IM.
295. Id.

1986]

BINA TIONAL POLLUTION AGREEMENT

APPENDIX
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES
ON COOPERATION FOR THE
PROTECTION AND
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE BORDER
AREA
The United States of America and the United Mexican States,
RECOGNIZING the importance of a healthful environment to the
long-term economic and social well-being of present and future generations of each country as well as of the global community;
RECALLING that the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, proclaimed in Stockholm in 1972,
called upon nations to collaborate to resolve environmental problems
of common concern;
NOTING previous agreements and programs providing for environmental cooperation between the two countries;
BELIEVING that such cooperation is of mutual benefit in coping
with similar environmental problems in each country;
ACKNOWLEDGING

the important work of the International

Boundary and Water Commission and the contribution of the agreements concluded between the two countries relating to environmental
affairs;
REAFFIRMING

their political will to further strengthen and

demonstrate the importance attached by both governments to cooperation on environmental protection and in furtherance of the principle
of good neighborliness;
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1
The United States of America and the United Mexican States,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, agree to cooperate in the field of
environmental protection in the border area on the basis of equality,
reciprocity and mutual benefit. The objectives of the present Agreement are to establish the basis for cooperation between the Parties for
the protection, improvement and conservation of the environment and
the problems which affect it, as well as to agree on necessary measures
to prevent and control pollution in the border area, and to provide the
framework for development of a system of notification for emergency
situations. Such objectives shall be pursued without prejudice to the
cooperation which the Parties may agree to undertake outside the border area.
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ARTICLE 2
The Parties undertake, to the fullest extent practical, to adopt the
appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution in their respective territory which affect the border area of the
other.
Additionally, the Parties shall cooperate in the solution of the
environmental problems of mutual concern in the border area, in
accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.
ARTICLE 3
Pursuant to this Agreement, the Parties may conclude specific
arrangements for the solution of common problems in the border area,
which may be annexed thereto. Similarly, the Parties may also agree
upon annexes to this Agreement on technical matters.
ARTICLE 4
For the purposes of this Agreement, it shall be understood that
the "border area" refers to the area situated 100 kilometers on either
side of the inland and maritime boundaries between the Parties.
ARTICLE 5
The Parties agree to coordinate their efforts, in conformity with
their own national legislation and existing bilateral agreements, to
address problems of air, land and water pollution in the border area.
ARTICLE 6
To implement this Agreement, the Parties shall consider and, as
appropriate, pursue in a coordinated manner practical, legal, institutional and technical measures for protecting the quality of the environment in the border area. Forms of cooperation may include:
coordination of national programs; scientific and educational
exchanges; environmental monitoring; environmental impact assessment; and periodic exchanges of information and data on likely
sources of pollution in their respective territory which may produce
environmentally polluting incidents, as defined in an annex to this
Agreement.
ARTICLE 7
The Parties shall assess, as appropriate, in accordance with their
respective national laws, regulations and policies, projects that may
have significant impacts on the environment of the border area, so that
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appropriate measures may be considered to avoid or mitigate adverse
environmental effects.
ARTICLE 8
Each Party designates a national coordinator whose principal
functions will be to coordinate and monitor implementation of this
Agreement, make recommendations to the Parties, and organize the
annual meetings referred to in Article 10, and the meetings of the
experts referred to in Article 11. Additional responsibilities of the
national coordinators may be agreed to in an annex to this Agreement.
In the case of the United States of America the national coordinator shall be the Environmental Protection Agency, and in the case of
Mexico it shall be the Secretaria Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologia,
through the Subsecretaria de Ecologia.
ARTICLE 9
Taking into account the subjects to be examined jointly, the
national coordinators may invite, as appropriate, representatives of
federal, state and municipal governments to participate in the meetings provided for in this Agreement. By mutual agreement they may
also invite representatives of international governmental or non-governmental organizations who may be able to contribute some element
of expertise on problems to be solved.
The national coordinators will determine by mutual agreement
the form and manner of participation of non-governmental entities.
ARTICLE 10
The Parties shall hold at a minimum an annual high level meeting
to review the manner in which this Agreement is being implemented.
These meetings shall take place alternatively in the border area of
Mexico and the United States of America.
The composition of the delegations which represent each Party,
both in these annual meetings as well as in the meetings of experts
referred to in Article 11, will be communicated to the other Party
through diplomatic channels.
ARTICLE 11
The Parties may, as they deem necessary, convoke meetings of
experts for the purposes of coordinating their national programs
referred to in Article 6, and of preparing the drafts of the specific
arrangements and technical annexes referred to in Article 3.
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These meetings of experts may review technical subjects. The
opinions of the experts in such meetings shall be communicated by
them to the national coordinators, and will serve to advise the Parties
on technical matters.
ARTICLE 12
Each Party shall ensure that its national coordinator is informed
of activities of its cooperating agencies carried out under this Agreement. Each Party shall also ensure that its national coordinator is
informed of the implementation of other agreements concluded
between the two governments concerning matters related to this
Agreement. The national coordinators of both Parties shall present to
the annual meeting a report on the environmental aspects of all joint
work conducted under this Agreement and on implementation of
other relevant agreements between the Parties, both bilateral and
multilateral.
Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice or otherwise affect the
functions entrusted to the International Boundary and Water Commission, in accordance with the Water Treaty of 1944.
ARTICLE 13
Each Party shall be responsible for informing its border states
and for consulting them in accordance with their respective constitutional systems, in relation to matters covered by this Agreement.
ARTICLE 14
Unless otherwise agreed, each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the implementation of this Agreement, including the
expenses of personnel who participate in any activity undertaken on
the basis of it.
For the training of personnel, the transfer of equipment and the
construction of installations related to the implementation of this
Agreement, the Parties may agree on a special modality of financing,
taking into account the objectives defined in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 15
The Parties shall facilitate the entry of equipment and personnel
related to this Agreement, subject to the laws and regulations of the
receiving country.
In order to undertake the monitoring of polluting activities in the
border area, the Parties shall undertake consultations relating to the
measurement and analysis of polluting elements in the border area.
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ARTICLE 16
All technical information obtained through the implementation
of this Agreement will be available to both Parties. Such information
may be made available to third parties by the mutual agreement of the
Parties to this Agreement.
ARTICLE 17
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prejudice other
existing or future agreements concluded between the two Parties, or
affect the rights and obligations of the Parties under international
agreements to which they are a party.
ARTICLE 18
Activities under this Agreement shall be subject to the availability
of funds and other resources to each Party and to the applicable laws
and regulations in each country.
ARTICLE 19
The present Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of
Notes stating that each Party has completed its necessary internal
procedures.
ARTICLE 20
The present Agreement shall remain in force indefinitely unless
one of the Parties notifies the other, through diplomatic channels, of
its desire to denounce it, in which case the Agreement will terminate
six months after the date of such written notification. Unless otherwise agreed, such termination shall not affect the validity of any
arrangements made under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 21
This Agreement may be amended by the agreement of the Parties.
ARTICLE 22
The adoption of the annexes and of the specific arrangements provided for in Article 3, and the amendments thereto, will be effected by
an exchange of Notes.
ARTICLE 23
This Agreement supersedes the exchange of Notes, concluded on
June 19, 1978 with the attached Memorandum of Understanding
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between the Environmental Protection Agency of the United States
and the Subsecretariat for Environmental Improvement of Mexico for
Cooperation on Environmental Programs and Transboundary
Problems.
DONE, in duplicate, in the city of La Paz, Baja California, Mexico, on the 14th of August of 1983, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE UNITED MEXICAN

OF AMERICA:

STATES:

